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A SYSTEM OF NATURAL THEISM

By

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"A System of General Ethics," "A System of Christian Evidence," "A Manual of Christian Ethics," "The Problem of Origins," "Man's First Disobedience," etc.

SECOND EDITION, REVISED

1927

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FOREWORD

PRIMARILY this work is intended for a textbook in colleges, theological seminaries, and other schools which may arrange for such a discipline in their curricula. For this reason the outlines and various divisions of the system are made conspicuous by means of numerals, captions, wide spaces, and different fonts of type. It is believed that this method will prove helpful in a number of ways for pedagogical purposes.

The author also believes that a systematic arrangement of material and data will be just as acceptable to the general reader.

Many valuable books have been written on the subject of Theism, and the author has no criticism to pass on most of them. However, as an instructor in this discipline, he has found that most of these works have little adaptation for textbook purposes, and are often too abstrusely expressed for the general reader.

The author is convinced that the positive arguments for the divine existence set forth in Part II of this work have not been invalidated by any of the latest and best attested discoveries of science, but have rather been strengthened by them; and in this respect his views coincide with those of many of the most profound recent writers on Theism.

That there is need today of thorough and well-reasoned teaching on this subject is patent to every one who is conversant with present-day college tendencies. Indeed, among all classes of thinkers, whether in college or out, there is a

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call for a clear and positive presentation of the theistic proofs. A questionnaire sent out by Professor James H. Leuba, of Bryn Mawr College, to a large number of scientists of the country elicited the response that a majority of them are either agnostical regarding the existence of God, or have become positively atheistic.

We believe, therefore, that a work like the present one is needed—provided, of course, the author has succeeded in making the arguments effective and convincing. Whether he has succeeded or failed, his motive has been an earnest one. It has been to furnish a book presenting the arguments by which the dangerous tendencies to agnosticism and materialism may be counteracted. The author is especially anxious that the book may find its way into the curricula of many of the colleges of the country, whether Church or State institutions, so that our educated youth—our future leaders of thought and action — may be thoroughly grounded in theistic belief, and may be saved from plunging into the maelstrom of materialism. The work might also be used as a supplementary text or reference-book in the department of Apologetics in theological seminaries.

L. S. K.

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FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

It is gratifying to know that a second edition of this work is required. Among general readers the first edition has met with not a little acceptance, while, as the author had hoped would be the case, it has been used as a textbook in quite a number of colleges and theological seminaries. With a single exception, so far as the author knows, the reviewers have treated it with respect, and many of them with fine cordiality.

In these days of lax thinking, which is apt sooner or later to lead to lax living, a book that stalwartly upholds the theistic world-view, and makes no compromise with the opposing mechanistic views, is certainly needed in our colleges and universities, and likewise with the reading and thinking public in general.

In the Foreword of the first edition of this work, reference was made to Professor James H. Leuba's book, "The Belief in God and Immortality," in which the replies of many scientists of the country to a questionnaire were reported and tabulated. The record showed that the great majority of those scientists were either atheistic or agnostical. That book was published in 1916. During the intervening years we have looked in vain for a denial on the part of any considerable number of scientists that Dr. Leuba's findings were correct. We are disappointed that there has been no general protest. What is the meaning of this strange muteness? Whether it means assent to Leuba's discoveries or only indifference to the vital issues involved, this consensus of silence adds to the gravity of the

situation. The serious question is, Are many of our academic institutions converting our young people into materialists and agnostics? We make no accusation, but we do feel justified in leaving the question-mark stand.

The author has made considerable revision of the book. In a number of places he has tried to strengthen the argument, and to this end has profited by the kindly suggestions of several reviewers and the acute questions and remarks of some of his students in the classroom. No one goes to school quite so effectively as the teacher in a college. It is gratifying, too, to realize how long and deep are some of the thoughts of youth.

At the courteous suggestion of Dr. William Brenton Greene, Jr., of Princeton Theological Seminary, the author has added a section on Pluralism, and has also tried to make his theodicy—the defense of God's goodness and justice—more cogent and complete. A subdivision has also been given to Pragmatism. The doctrine of a finite God, advocated by John Stuart Mill, William James and H. G. Wells, has also received consideration. The bibliography has been enlarged, and has been brought up to date; although it does not claim to be exhaustive. Many new footnotes have been added, which the author hopes will be informing.

L. K. S.

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DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AND RELATIONS

I. The Divine Attributes.
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A SYSTEM OF NATURAL THEISM

PART I

INTRODUCTORY DATA

CHAPTER I

I. DEFINITION AND TERMS.

1. Definition.

Natural Theism is the science which treats of the existence and character of God in the light of nature and reason.

2. Terms.

Our science is known by various designations, namely: Natural Theism, Rational Theism, Natural Theology, and sometimes simply Theism.

The term "Natural Theism" seems to the author to be preferable for several reasons: (1) The word "Natural" clearly distinguishes our science from Revealed or Biblical Theism; (2) the word "Theism" is more suitable than the word "Theology" for students who do not intend to enter a theological seminary; (3) the adjective "Natural" is preferred to the adjective "Rational" because the latter might suggest or imply that Christian Theism is not rational, whereas we believe the opposite to be true. Even the word "Natural," as used here, should be distinguished thus: its opposite is not "unnatural," but "supernatural." Christian

Theism depends mostly on the supernatural revelation, while Natural Theism depends solely on the light of nature and reason.

The word "Theism" is derived from the Greek: *Theos,* God.

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

1. The Place of Reason.

Reason has its uses and its limitations. Its processes should not be contemned. It is obviously a divinely implanted power of the human mind, and it is rational to assume that it was intended to be used. Many minds also find pleasure in rational processes, and that would be an additional evidence that they are to be employed. No less true is it that the mind is so constituted that it cannot accept anything that seems to it to be incredible and irrational.

On the other hand, the powers of human reason should not be over-estimated. There are many problems which human intellection has not yet solved, in spite of all its endeavors. Among these problems are the following: What is matter? What is life? What is mind? How are matter and mind correlated in the human brain? How can the mind cognize objective reality? How can the will determine itself in liberty?

Mr. Edison declared some time ago that, with all his knowledge of the power of electricity, he did not know whether it is a substance or only a force. Therefore, reason should be modest in pressing its claims; it should "not think more highly of itself than it ought to think."

In dealing with the theistic problems in this work, we shall use human reason with the foregoing principles ever in mind. We think it will be found that most of the meth-

ods of reasoning employed will lead to proper conclusions; at least, to those that are more tenable than the opposite conclusions would be. Yet we cannot presume to think that all our inductions and deductions will be convincing to all classes of minds. Perhaps no purely rational process can give the human mind absolute assurance of the existence of God, especially the mind that has once been caught in the meshes of atheism. That assurance doubtless can be obtained only through a clear-cut Christian experience.

However, with all the limitations of our human faculties, we sincerely believe that the theistic position can be shown to be more reasonable and adequate than that of any of the anti-theistic theories.

2. Marks of God's Handiwork.[1]

If there is a God who made and sustains the universe, including human beings, it is reasonable to believe that we should be able to see marks of His handiwork in the creation. He surely would not leave Himself without a witness therein. These evidences should appear in the realms of both matter and mind. Every human artisan leaves such marks upon his handiwork. Why not the Divine Artisan?

2. Man's Intuitions and Mental Processes Reliable.[2]

In this work the intuitions and general laws of human thinking will, for the most part, be regarded as trustworthy. If man's cognitions of objective reality, time, space, cause and effect, moral distinctions, logical conclusions, etc., are

1. Cf. Valentine's "Natural Theology," pp. 1-3.

2. Cf. Valentine, *ut supra,* pp. 3, 4; Hibben's "The Problems of Philosophy," Chap. VII; Snowden's "The Personality of God," pp. 3, 4. In philosophy the problem of knowledge is called Epistemology.

not in the main reliable, true knowledge and science are utterly impossible, and we might as well stop before we begin our investigations. However, in many places in this work, especially in dealing with Idealism, Positivism and Kant's Phenomenalism, we shall endeavor to show the rational grounds of our faith in the general intuitions and experiences of the human mind.

A quotation from Dr. James H. Snowden is pertinent here: "We must trust something before we can know anything, and the mind must trust itself or it cannot prove or disprove anything. If it cannot know that it is trustworthy, then it cannot know that it is untrustworthy, and all knowledge is a an end."[3]

4. Theism a Science.

Theism is a true science, and for these reasons: It deals with observed and empirical facts, makes proper inductions from them, and arranges them in systematic order, just as is done in any other branch of science. Besides, the data it treats of are just as patent, just as outstanding, and just as potent in their influence as are the data of any other worthy domain of investigation.

True, at times *a priori* methods must be used and philosophical principles appealed to, but this is true of all the sciences, however empirical; for no scientific mind can avoid raising philosophical questions.

5. History and Development of our Science.

While there has always been religion among men, centuries passed before any attempt was made to formulate a *science of religion.* The greatest of the Greek and Roman philosophers—Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca—

3. "The Personality of God," p. 3.

made efforts along this line, in connection with their treatment of other philosophic problems. However, it is only in modern times that Natural Theism has been so developed that it can rightfully take its place among the sciences that are worthy of the name. The same may be said of practically all the sciences, whether physical, mental, moral or theistic.

6. Some Vital Relations of Theism.

(1) *To Christian Theology.*

This relation is that of a part to the whole; that is, Christian theology includes all the light derived from nature and reason, and adds to it the clearer light of the divine revelation in the Bible. According to the Holy Scriptures themselves, the God who revealed His will in this special way also "created the heavens and the earth" (Gen. 1:1), and rules over the universe, and reveals His glory therein (Psalm 19:1). Christ, who came to redeem mankind, proved Himself master of the natural realm as well as of the spiritual. Therefore, it is correct to say that Christian Theology includes the chief data of Natural Theism.

No doubt all scientific theists in Bible lands are more or less influenced by the Christian revelation, whether they are distinctly conscious of it or not. As Christianity is one of the outstanding facts of the world, it cannot be ignored in any system of Theism that professes to be scientific. It is a patent fact that the greatest and most satisfactory systems of Natural Theism are those that have been wrought out by men who accept the Bible as a divine revelation.

(2) *To Religion.*

Without the doctrine of God—a God who is a personal Being—there can be no religion deserving of the title. The

very idea of religion involves communion with the supernatural. Men have attempted to establish a religion on the basis of an impersonal power in the universe (Pantheism), or on the worship of Humanity (Positivism), but such forms of religion are extremely vague, and possess little, if any, practical value, as will be proved in subsequent theses. "The doctrine of God is the first doctrine of religion."

(3) *To Morality.*

The theistic view of the cosmos furnishes the only adequate ground, sanction and inspiration of true morality. The denial of God's existence logically results in the negation of moral distinctions; for if there is no personal God back of the universe, why should one thing be right and another wrong?[4] This subject will be elaborated in the chapter on the Moral Argument for the divine existence.

(4) *To the State.*

Since religion and morality are necessary to the welfare and perpetuity of the State, Theism lies at the very foundation of civic well-being. It is doubtful whether a government whose subjects were all atheists could subsist for any considerable time. At least, no country has ever ventured to try the experiment. A professed atheist cannot even take an oath in a civil court. Therefore, for the sake of the State the young people of our schools and colleges should be well grounded in the reasons for the theistic view of the world.

(5) *To Science and Philosophy.*

Theism furnishes the foundation for true science and philosophy; for it places back of all observed data and

4. Goldwin Smith: "The denial of the existence of God and of a future state is, in a word, the dethronement of conscience."

phenomena an ordering Mind, thus positing a real basis for system in science and for ultimate unity in philosophy. Without an ordering Intelligence back of all things as the Creator and Governor, the universe would have no order and system, and so would not be intelligible, and could not, therefore, be an object of investigation by the human mind. Intelligibleness in the cosmos connotes Intelligence as the *cause* of the cosmos.

III. THE CONCEPTION OF GOD.

1. Its Content.

There are *variable conceptions* of God among the people of the earth. They range from the crude, hazy and imperfect ideas of pagan people to the clear and correct view that God is the Supreme, Absolute and Infinite Personality who is the First Cause.

2. Its Genesis.

(1) A number of *erroneous views* regarding the rise of the idea of God have been advocated from time to time. Let us examine these:

a. Some persons hold that the idea of God arose from *superstitious dread of the awful and mysterious in nature.* This is not an adequate view, for, if it were true, then, when superstitious fear is removed by greater knowledge, the idea of God would fade away; but, instead of that being the result, the conception of God becomes clearer and belief in Him more persistent as men advance in knowledge of the universe and its wonders. It would be gratuitous and childish to hold that the belief of the many educated theists of today is primarily due to the superstitious fears of primeval ancestors.

b. Some unbelievers maintain that the *crafty inventions*

of priests and kings account for the origin of the idea of God. This is an antiquated opinion. No well-informed person would hold it now-a-days. If men have no natural faculty for religion, how could designing men ever obtain so potent an influence over almost the entire human family? If there is no God, how could the idea of the divine Being arise even in the minds of imposters? Besides, the many intelligent people today who believe in God could not be deluded in that way.

c. Others hold that *ancestral reverence* gave rise to the idea of God. But it has been found that many nations who do not worship their forefathers, and never did worship them, have positive conceptions of a divine Being. Hence this explanation is inadequate.

d. Traditions of a *primitive revelation* are regarded by some as the origin of the idea of God. This may *in part* explain why most men believe in God, especially if the tradition is founded on fact; yet it is not probable that *mere tradition,* in view of its uncertainty, would have kept the idea alive with so much persistency through all the ages, if there were not an innate disposition to believe in the divine Being. Besides, one might well ask how the *tradition* arose.

e. According to other speculatists, *mere intuition or innate consciousness* adequately accounts for the genesis of the God idea. This of itself would not be a sufficient explanation, for such an intuition or consciousness must itself be accounted for. It could not have come by chance, nor could the God-idea have evolved without an adequate objective basis and source.

f. Today some theorists contend that the idea of God originated in *purely rational processes.* This view is confuted by the patent fact that many primitive people who be-

lieve in God never could have mastered the profound arguments of systematic Theism. Moreover, some profound philosophers have become very obscure in their conceptions of God, while others have landed in agnosticism and even atheism.

(2) What, then, may be regarded as the *true view* of the origin of the idea of God? Only that view which affords an adequate explanation of all the facts in the case can be regarded as scientific:

a. Man was *created in the image of God.* Of course, this is a proposition that remains to be proved; but supposing for the moment that it is a fact, it surely would adequately account for man's innate capacity for knowing God and his longing for communion with Him. If man is not like God in some respects, he could have no idea of God, no communion with Him, no vital relation to Him. Therefore, man must bear the image of his Maker.

b. There is, in addition, the view of a *primitive revelation.* While we do not believe that Natural Theism needs to insist on this item, yet, if such a revelation was made, it would have so deepened the capacity for the idea of God in the primitive man as to help to account adequately for the persistency and universality of the idea.

c. A study of ethnology proves that man has a *natural disposition to infer the existence of a Creator and Preserver from the character of the cosmos.* This inference is almost intuitive, and requires no profound logical processes of thought. The only adequate explanation of this universal phenomenon is that the capacity for the God idea and the disposition to cherish it have been divinely implanted in man's mind. Surely the idea of God never could have evolved from a non-idea of God.

3. Its Original Form.[5]

(1) *Wrong Views.*

A number of erroneous views of the original form of the theistic idea are held by certain classes of advocates. We shall merely mention and define them here, reserving our reasons for rejecting them to the discussion of the true view under (2) below. The erroneous views are the following:

a. *Fetichism.*

The worship of natural objects, which are regarded by the votaries as possessed by spirits. Animism (from *anima,* soul) is practically the same form of superstition. Fetichism is from *facticius,* which means "made by art," ficticious.

b. *Polytheism.*

The worship of many gods, which are regarded as more or less above and distinct from natural objects. Polytheism is from the Greek, *polus,* many, and *Theos,* God.

c. *Henotheism.*

The idea of simply a national or tribal God, but not the one and only God of the whole universe. When a nation believes that it is presided over by only one God, while other nations are ruled by other gods, that nation would hold to the henotheistic religion. Henotheism is from *henos,* one, and *Theos,* God.[6]

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5. For much of this section we are indebted to Valentine's "Natural Theology," which is of great value.

6. A friendly reviewer of the first edition of this book thought that our definition of Henotheism was wrong. He said: "Henotheism is not the belief in a tribal god, but is a term applied by Max Mueller to the disposition of pagans to attribute to a particular god, on certain occasions, the powers of all the others." However, both the Century and the Standard Dictionaries uphold the definition of the text, as well as the one given by Max Mueller. This is the definition given by the Standard Dictionary: "The doctrine that ascribes

(2) *The True View.*

We believe that the original conception was Monotheism (Greek, *monus,* one, and *Theos,* God), the conception of one God and only one, who presides over all nations and over the whole cosmos. Our reasons for holding this view, and rejecting the foregoing views under a, b and c are the folowing:

a. *Psychological Reason.*

It would be easier for primitive man to conceive of only one God than of many gods. The natural developement of the human mind is from one to many, from the singular to the plural, from the simple to the complex, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. All evolutionists define the process and development of the cosmos in these terms and in this order. This argument may not appeal to some persons, because they are apt to think of men as they are today; but let us try to imagine the primeval man as the first idea of God arises in his mind, and we shall see that his initial conception must have been of *one* God. Afterward the idea of more than one god would dawn upon his thought.

b. *Philological Reason.*

In most of the principal languages of the world the word for God comes from the same root. Many of the greatest linguists[7] proclaim this view. While it may seem to point to nothing more than the unitary origin of the human family, yet the idea of one God would agree better with the fact of one root-word for God than would the idea of a plurality of gods.

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supreme power to some one of several gods in turn; also, the belief in a special supreme god for each region, race or nation." So also the Century Dictionary.

7. Cf. Valentine, *ut supra,* p. 18.

c. *Historical Reason.*

The further back we trace the histories of the chief religions, the more nearly do they approach to the doctrine of pure monotheism. This is simply a question of fact, not of mere theory and speculation. It is true of the religions of Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, India and China.[8] History fails to record a single example of a nation or tribe that has advanced by its own efforts from a state of animism and polytheism to the monotheistic conception.[9] On the other hand, history tells us of numerous cases of decline and degeneration in religion. In this place we appeal to the Bible only as one of the historical books of the world, and in it we find first the conception of one God, who "created the heavens and the earth," whereas afterward arose the tendency to degenerate into idolatry or polytheism. "The Book of the Dead" is one of the oldest Egyptian documents yet found; it teaches monotheism, while later Egyptian theology has its pantheon. All this affords strong proof that the original form of the God idea was that of monotheism.

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8. Valentine, pp. 19, 20; Max Muller, "Chips from a German Workshop;" Renouf: "Hibbert Lectures on the Religion of Ancient Egypt," pp. 92, 93; James Legge, "The Religion of China," pp. 11, 16.

9. James Orr, "The Christian Conception of God and the World," pp. 75, 409-412 (the latter reference is very valuable). See also cogent statement by Dr. F. P. Ramsay in "The Princeton Theological Review" for April, 1917, page 355. Dr. Ramsay says: "There is no known instance of monotheism being derived from polytheism. . . . So far as the present writer knows, there is not one scintilla of proof of the existence of any people whose ancestors were never monotheistic; and monotheism is as old as any trustworthy human records." Principal A. M. Fairbairn ("Studies in the Philosophy of Religion," p. 12) and Max Mueller ("Is Fetichism a Primitive Form of Religion?" p. 105) make similar statements. Cf. Kellogg's "Handbook of Comparative Religion," pp. 157-160; Tisdall's "Comparative Religion," pp. 15-40, 41, 42.

d. *Ethnological Reason.*

As has been already indicated, there has been a general tendency among the nations which have been unenlightened by Christianity to degeneration in religion. The movement has been downward instead of upward—devolution instead of evolution. This fact would point to an original pure form of religion, namely, monotheism, while polytheism and fetichism would be later decadent and corrupted forms.

PART II

PROOFS OF THE DIVINE EXISTENCE

CHAPTER II

GENERAL ARGUMENT

I. DEFINITION.

The General Argument is that form of theistic proof which is based on the universal belief in God and the universal religious instinct.[1]

II. DIVISIONS.

1. The Universal Belief in God.

(1) *History and ethnology* prove that all *nations* have a belief in a Supernatural Being or in supernatural beings. True, a certain class of scientists once contended that tribes had been found in central Africa and Australia who had no conception of divine or supernatural beings; but later investigations have disproved their contention. Even if such tribes had been found, what would have been their state of

1. In his excellent work, "Natural Theology," Dr. Milton Valentine calls the first class of proofs "The Presumptive Arguments," by which he means those arguments which, while they do not afford a clearly logical demonstration, yet offer a more or less convincing presumption that there is a God. However, after a good deal of thought on the subject, we are convinced that these arguments are quite as convincing as are the other arguments. In lieu of a better term, therefore, we use the word "General," because the proof deals with the general or universal belief in God, etc. The last two divisions included by Valentine under the "Presumptive Argument" belong more logically elsewhere, and are located in this work in what we regard as the proper places.

civilization? It surely would have been of the lowest type. But human beliefs, especially those of an exalted and morally potent character, should not be gauged by the most degraded conceptions. Would it not be more rational to form our conceptions of the divine Being and His existence from the highest forms of civilization? We do not determine our ideas of science, morality and esthetics from the conceptions held by the lowest, crudest and basest tribes. Why, then, our ideas of God? Besides, such inferior tribes, if actually found, would be so exceptional as to prove that belief in God is the general rule. However, the best results of research thus far lead us to conclude that there are no exceptions.

Objection may be made on the ground that in many tribes the conception of God or of gods is extremely crude, gross and grotesque. Very true; but still the idea is present, and in most positive form. Pagan nations have crude ideas of other important facts and realities, such as would come under the head of physical science, civil government and moral distinctions. We must also admit that perhaps our own conceptions of the Deity fall far below the wonderful and glorious reality.

Some scholars regard Buddhism as an exception to the general belief in God or gods. They maintain that it is atheistic. However, we believe that deeper investigation proves Buddhism to have been originally and fundamentally monotheistic. Brahm[2] was "pure intelligence, sole and self-existent," and Buddha "absolute light and perfect wisdom." These are attributes that pertain only to a personal God.

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2. While Buddhism was a reformation of Hinduism (Brahmanism), it did not reject all Hindu ideas and doctrines; hence it retained the conception of Brahm.

Professed atheism in civilized lands is sometimes looked upon as a disproof of the general rule. But this reasoning is not sound for the following considerations: First, atheism is rare and exceptional, rather proving than disproving that theistic belief is the general rule; second, atheism is the result of a kind of speculative thinking that usually disregards the testimony of consciousness and experience; third, atheists always posit some primal cause in the place of God and predicate of it many godlike qualities.

(2) Now what is the *clear inference* from the universal belief in God? Surely it must connote that He exists. If there is no God, if there is nothing in the universe but material substance, how could the idea of God ever have arisen at all in the human mind? Could mere materiality ever have evolved the conception of a divine Being? Water cannot rise higher than its source. And why should the idea of God become so general, persistent, dominant and potent? If material substance is the only entity, and yet has led almost the entire human family to believe that there is a God, then material substance must be a universal falsifier. In that case you could not trust its testimony on any subject.

Let us apply the scientific law of causality to this argument: every effect must have an adequate cause. If there is a God, and He created the world, and implanted in man's mind the capacity for the God idea, we have an entirely adequate cause for the grand effect, namely, that practically all men and nations believe in the divine existence. This view will also account adequately for the spontaneity of the idea in the universal human mind.

The law of causality can be applied still further here: If there is no God back of the cosmos, the idea of God never

could have arisen in the human mind; for nothing can be evolved that was not previously involved. The idea of Deity could never have evolved from a no-God source. Mere material substance never could evolve by means of mere resident forces into any idea, much less so great an idea as that of a Supreme and Absolute Being. Water does not rise higher than its source. However, if God is back of and in the process, an adequate cause has been assigned for the grand outcome.

Should the objection be raised that, if there is a God, He would have bestowed upon the human family a clear and perfect conception of His being and character from the start, we would reply that God evidently has chosen the method of progressive knowledge rather than the method of initial completeness. Geology teaches that the lower forms of life appeared first; afterwards the higher forms. "First the corn, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear" seems to be God's *modus operandi* in nature. For purposes of His own, whose wisdom we may not question, He has ordained also that the conception of Himself shall be a matter of progressive unfolding. The science of the day should interpose no objection to this method of the divine procedure.[3]

2. The Universal Religious Instinct.

(1) Men in all the world not only believe in God, but also engage in acts of *worship and devotion.* The most recent ethnological researches prove that religious sentiments exist in all nations and tribes. A few years ago the National Geographic Society sent out its scientific representatives to study the various ethnic tribes of the world.

3. The perplexing problem of the origin and permission of sin and suffering will be dealt with in a later chapter.

After the most careful and unbiased investigations, these men testified that they had found no people who did not have some form of religion, some religious sentiment. This was the testimony, not of theologians, but of purely scientific investigators, who could have had no *ex parte* interest in the results.

(2) Not only so, but the religious principle is *extremely potent in all nations,* dominating individual and community life. It is not merely a casual or negligable factor. Witness the predominating influence of religion in India, China and Japan. The same is true of peoples who are far down in the scale of civilization, as, for example, the jungle folk of Africa.

(3) Everywhere the *human heart has a craving for God* —"feels after Him, if perchance it may find Him" (Acts 17:27). The Psalmist puts this general yearning in vivid phrase: "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee" (Psalm 42:1, 2).

(4) It will be said that *there are exceptions,* at least, in the so-called civilized countries; that there are people who do not seem to have any desire for religion and religious worship. We reply, the apparent exceptions do not invalidate the rule, and that for the following reasons:

a. There are men here and there who have obscure and crass ideas of the good and the beautiful as well as of the spiritual. Does this prove that there are no inherent ethical and esthetic principles in human nature and no moral and esthetic realities?

b. Sin has come into the world, and has darkened man's spiritual insight; has, in a measure, brought a feeling of constraint between God and men, and in many instances has partly seared the human conscience.

c. Even unbelievers and rationalists often feel impelled to substitute some form of religion and worship for the forms they seek to destroy. As conspicuous examples, note Comte, Strauss, Haeckel, Tyndall, etc.

(5) Now what are the *logical inferences* from the foregoing facts?

It is reasonable to believe that there must be a reality to complement and answer to this universal craving for communion with God. In nature's realm food is provided to satisfy hunger, water for thirst, music for the ear, light and color for the eye. The only complement for the universal religious craving would be a personal God. Is it probable that we have been constituted to have our bodily wants supplied, while our higher wants, those of the soul, must go unsatisfied? If such were the case, the cosmos would not be a rational one.

CHAPTER III

TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

I. DEFINITION.

1. Of the Teleological Argument.[1]

This is the argument for the divine existence which is based on *the evidence of design, purpose and adaptation in the creation.* It is best known as the argument from *design, purpose* or *final cause.*[2]

2. Of Final Cause.

The Final Cause is the end or purpose in the mind of the designer in the planning and making of a structure. It is called the *Final* Cause because its manifestation appears at the end of the process. In reality it is the *primary* cause, for it exists first of all in the mind of the designer.

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1. On this argument compare the following valuable works: Valentine, "Natural Theology," pp. 74-205 (most thorough-going); Orr, "The Christian View of God and the World," pp. 97-103, 415-418; Lindsay, "Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy," pp. 170-215; Fisher, "The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief," pp. 29-55; Balfour, "Theism and Humanism," pp. 42-63 (rather unique in mode of presentation); Micou, "Basic Ideas in Religion," pp. 50-99 (also consult index); Bruce, "Apologetics," pp. 150-153 (clear and succint); Ward, "What I Believe and Why," Chapters I-XII. The author does not commend all parts of Dr. Ward's book, especially the portions dealing with Christianity and the Bible; but the chapters cited, which treat of Theism, are excellent. For a fresh treatment of Teleology, see Pringle-Pattison's "The Idea of God," pp. 322-341.

2. Sometimes called the Eutaxiological Argument when design in the universe as a whole is considered. From *eutaxia,* order, and *logos.*

3. Of Efficient Cause.

The Efficient Cause is the force or forces employed by the designer to produce the desired effect.

4. Of Adaptation.

Adaptation is the selection and use of the proper means to secure the desired effect.

II. ETYMOLOGY.

The term Teleology is derived from the Greek: *Telos,* end, and *logos,* discourse.

III. RELATIONS.

Final and Efficient Causes are thus related: The former determines what forces or energies shall constitute the latter and how they shall be employed throughout the process. Final Cause is dependent on the Efficient Causes that are available for accomplishing its purpose. Thus they are mutually dependent. Efficient Cause without Final Cause would bring only chaos; Final Cause without Efficient Cause would be helpless.

IV. PROOFS OF DESIGN IN THE COSMOS.[3]

1. In Organisms.

The eye, the ear, the hand, foot, lungs, heart, man's entire anatomical structure; the structure of animals.

The latest researches in physiology prove that the human eye has 800 complemental contrivances,[4] all of which are necessary to sight. Study its complicated structure, and note what a wonderful piece of mechanism it is. Its various parts are so constructed and combined as to bring

3. Many of the examples selected from Valentine's presentation.
4. Kinsley, "Was Christ Divine?" p. 13.

about, so far as we can understand, only one purpose, namely, vision. If the mechanism of the eye was ever designed for any other purpose than sight, it has never dawned on the intelligence of man. However, even the 800 organic particulars do not exhaust the number in the eye, for it must be remembered that the substance of this organ is composed of atoms, molecules, and perhaps of vortices, ions and electrons, and all these had to be brought together in conformity with the plan and purpose of organ.

The ear is scarcely less complicated. But how different from the eye! Its purpose being different, it has been organized on an entirely different model, and one that points just as inevitably to a definite intention. The very fact that it is so different from the eye, because its purpose is so different, accentuates the proof of specific design for auditory ends.

Every part of the human hand connotes a definite end in view. If the human hand were like that of the monkey, the ape or the gorilla, man, with all his intelligence, could make little or no progress in mechanics, and thus progress and civilization would be almost impossible. None of the arts and sciences could be developed.

The human foot was evidently designed for the specific end of enabling man to walk, and walk uprightly. What a beneficent arrangement! Just one point: There is a ligament running crosswise of the instep which holds the parallel cords in their place in the graceful and necessary curve on the upper part of the foot. This fact is so patent and convincing a proof of confederate and specific purpose that it cannot be gainsaid.

But note man's entire anatomical structure. All these various organs are combined into a unified plan. Respiration, circulation and digestion all join to produce a specific

result, just as if they had been put together by marvelous foresight. Note this, too: the retina is only in the eye; the tympanum only in the ear; the olfactory nerves only in the nose; the palate only at the upper end of the throat; all these are placed just where they should be for their several highly specialized purposes.

In the animal world the bird is organized on a highly specialized scheme for flying; the fish for swimming; the serpent for crawling; the quadruped for walking. Here is not only evidence of design, but also evidence of endless diversity of design.

2. In Animal Instinct.

Design is seen in the mervelous instinct of the bees in making their combs on the precise mathematical model best adapted for their purpose, combining lightness, strength and proper dimensions. No less marvelous is the instinct of ants, wasps, spiders and many other insects. Who taught the wasps and hornets to make their *papier maché?* Callow birds in the nest have only one way to be fed: almost immediately after they come from the shell, their instinct impels them to open their mouths for their food. Each species of animal instinctively takes its infantile food in its own way, and here again nature shows endless variety and obvious intentionality. "Each after its own kind."

3. In Chemistry and Physics.

In this realm there is patent proof of design. The combinations of atoms and molecules in various ways always bring about a highly specialized result. Oxygen and nitroben are combined in precisely the right ratio to form the volatile atmosphere which we breathe to sustain life, being fitted especially to the human organism. A different combination of these elements would be absolutely fatal to

animal life of any kind. Thus chemistry dovetails into biology. Hydrogen and oxygen in specific ratio form water, which again is admirably adapted to human and animal need.

Respecting water there is a specific fact that is worthy of attention. Cold almost invariably contracts substances. As water cools, it follows this general law to a certain degree of temperature; then just at the right point — the "strategic moment," we had almost said — it begins to expand by virtue of its crystalizing propensity, forms ice, becomes lighter than the water, and remains on the upper surface. If it continued to contract and grow heavier, the ice would sink to the bottom of all our rivers, ponds and lakes; soon they would be converted into a solid mass of ice during the winter, destroying all animal life in the water, and melting very little during the summer. Neither would the warmth of summer ever succeed in thawing the frost out of the ground. What a beneficent contrivance of nature do we see here!

Fire for warmth is another beneficent arrangement. It also produces carbon dioxide and aqueous vapor, which are then absorbed by the trees and grasses as their food. As fire is the result of the combination of the oxygen of the air and the carbon of combustible substances, why does not a little blaze set the entire atmosphere into conflagration? Because nature has herself placed an embargo on such a result. As Dr. Milton Valentine says: "Everything appears to be ordered so as to run in channels of economic utility."

4. In Biology.

The growth, divisions and combinations of cells are so specific in bringing about the various forms of life and organisms that no one can fail to see here abundant proof of intentionality.

5. In Psychology.

The human mind usually acts with conscious and definite purpose. Let it be remembered that the human mind is part of the cosmos, and is fitted into it in a most vital way. The very fact that it is a purposive mind implies the idea of purpose in the cosmos.[5]

6. In the Universe as a Whole.

Its wise arrangement, its unity of plan, its mathematical precision of movement, and its adaptation in innumerable ways to human need — all these point indubitably to final cause in its origin and structure. Many persons who are not deeply impressed with the argument of design when applied to individual structures in nature, are convinced of the validity of the design argument when applied to the entire cosmos. However, we cannot agree to such methods of reasoning. Suppose you were to pass through a great factory or mill, constructed for the specific purpose of turning out a certain product, would you say that the structure as a whole gives proof of design, but the smaller mechanisms do not? You surely would not reason in so lame a way. Every individual part of the structure is a work of design. If it were not, the factory would never turn its specific product. So with the universe.[6]

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5. It is gratifying to note that William McDougall, the eminent psychologist, has lateely come out strongly in favor of "purposive psychology," over against what he aptly terms "the mechanical mosaic psychology." See his "Outline of Psychology," pp. viii and ix (preface). Many other recent writers on psychology take the same position, notably Pratt, Buckham, Roback, Spurr, Squires, Hudson and Norlie.

6. With much interest we have read Pringle-Pattison's chapter on "Teleology as a Cosmic Principle" in his book, "The Idea of God." He seems to quote Kant approvingly when the latter maintains that supreme intelligence is not to be invoked "to explain *particular* phenomena, instead of investigating their cause in a general

V. DESIGN CONNOTES AN INTELLIGENT DESIGNER.

1. Intelligence is the most *natural and spontaneous explanation* of order, purpose and adaptation. Therefore, to seek another cause for these effects in the cosmos, as Hume and Mill did, is to disregard the innate feelings and conceptions of the human mind. Besides, why should men try to find some obscure and indefinite cause when one may be seen lying clearly on the surface?

2. The *only cause of design* that we know of is *mind.* We certainly can attribute purpose and finality to no other known source. Therefore, either mind is the cause of the wonderful confederation seen in the universe, or else we know nothing of its causation. Our choice must lie between Theism and Agnosticism.

3. What is the *only alternative* of an intelligent First Cause? It is *chance.* We must choose between God and

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mechanism of matter." We should "look upon this systematic unity of nature in a perfectly general way in relation to the idea of a Supreme Intelligence." "The systematic unity of nature" is to be conceived as a "complete teleological unity." But neither Kant's nor Pringle-Pattison's twisting logic has convinced us that God could have made the cosmos "a teleological unity" without fitting all its parts to one another and to the whole. We are not daunted by the charge that our view makes God a "Mechanic" and an "Artificer," for in the human world no dishonor is attached to such workers; so why should such a view of God be lowering to His majesty? Did He not make man in His own image? Even so great a scientist as Clerk Maxwell contended that the atoms give every proof of being "manufactured articles;" and, more recently, Lord Kelvin's theory of the universal ether points in the same direction. The intrusion of evil and mischance into the cosmos does not destroy particular teleology, but rather eestablishes it, by proving that the universe has been so wisely contrived that, in spite of evil, it still accomplishes in the end its great and good original purpose. No human machine works perfectly, yet we know that all its parts are purposely fitted into the whole.

chance. But chance is utterly inadequate for the following reasons:

(1) It is unthinkable that blind chance could ever produce anything but chaos. But the universe is a cosmos, not a chaos. Could an orderly world ever have come out of chaos without an ordering Intelligence? The oustanding principle of the cosmos is law. If the world was produced by chance, then chance produced the very antithesis of itself! That certainly would be a marvelous exploit. It would be a greater miracle than the creation of the universe by an all-wise and all-powerful God.

(2) In this connection let us note the mathematical law of probability in permutations and geometrical progression:

On ten bells 3,628,800 changes can be rung. How much probability would there be of these bells ever playing the tune, "My country, 'tis of thee," by pure chance? Everyone knows this could never occur. Yet a trained mind could so manipulate the ten bells as to play many tunes. Thus design and order always imply intelligence—mind.

The 26 letters of the English alphabet are capable of so many different combinations that they would require 27 figures to express them. How much probability would there be that these letters would ever fall together into a book by pure fortuity? Yet human intelligence, working with design, may combine them in such order as to form vast libraries.

Take 100 dice blocks, numbered from one to 100, in your hand, and fling them promiscuously on the floor. How often would you have to repeat the performance to cause them to fall in a straight row in numerical order? However, by using thought and purpose you can easily lay them down in that way.

As has been said, the human eye has 800 complemental particulars, each of which is essential to sight. But this falls far short of the reality, for the eye is composed of an inconceivable number of atoms, molecules and living cells, to say nothing of vortices, ions, and electrons. There certainly would not be much *chance* for *chance* in this case. It should also be remembered that the eye is set in the midst of a congeries of many other organs, just as wonderful as itself, to which it is fitted and which are adapted to it. Divine intelligence back of this wonderfully purposeful arrangement is the only adequate explanation.[7]

4. The *human mind,* with its rational, self-determining and purposive powers, is a part of the cosmos, and is organically related to it. But the mental could not come from the non-mental, the purposive from the non-purposive, nor freedom from bald necessity. It is rational to believe that the Power that produced the human mind would be at least as purposive as its product.

5. All science is based on the principle that the cosmos is *intelligible to the human mind.* Otherwise no kind of kind of science would be possible; no order would be discernible; no classification of data could be made. As the cosmos is capable of being apprehended by intelligence, it must be the product of intelligence. This is practically the argument of Plato's doctrine of "Divine Ideas" discernible in the cosmos.

6. The science of *mathematics* furnishes cogent proof that an intelligent Being designed and constructed the universe. By abstract processes the human mind can solve mathematical problems, and arrive at absolutely correct re-

7. For telling illustrations showing the inadequacy of chance to produce the cosmos see De Tunzelmann's striking book, "God and the Universe," pp. 100-113.

sults. Now, when these principles are applied to the universe, as in mathematical astronomy, it is found that there is an exact correspondence between the principles and the empirical data. The universe is constructed according to a mathematical plan. Again this fact connotes intelligence —a mathematical Mind—as the cause of the universe.

7. As a scientific hypothesis, Theism is an *adequate explanation* of the cosmos and its phenomena, with all its marks of intentionality. No other hypothesis is adequate. According to scientific procedure, therefore, we ought to accept the hypothesis that furnishes the only adequate explanation of all the data.

8. To rivet the conclusion, the evidences of design in the universe prove that *intelligence and will* must be its cause; but intelligence and will are the attributes of *personality;* therefore, the cause of the universe must be a *Person—God.*

VI. OBJECTIONS TO TELEOLOGY STATED AND CONFUTED.

1. *Nature and art are very different* in their operations; therefore, design in the former may come from some other source than intelligence and personality. This is the objection of Hume and Mill.

Observe that this argument is based on a mere "may be." Without impugning the motives of the objectors, it creates the impression that it is a makeshift to avoid a reasonable conclusion. At all events, it seeks for an obscure and unknown cause rather than to accept the obvious and natural one. The human mind intuitively attributes design to intelligence and intelligence to personality. Therefore, the above objection runs counter to the normal processes of

human thinking, which knows of nothing higher and greater than a personal mind.

2. In nature the moving force is *immanent* (that is, within the structure); in art it is external. This is the chief argument of Pantheism.

While it is true that in nature the moving principle is within the structure, yet there must be something back of the immanent force to start and direct it along adaptive lines, or the result would be chaos instead of law and order. Blind force would surely be inadequate to produce orderly results, whether brought about immanently or transcendentally. "Unconscious intelligence" is a contradiction of terms. There can be no intelligence which does not work in the light of its own consciousness.

Besides, many works of art, like watches and other humanly contrived mechanisms, operate immanently; yet no one ever presumes to think that they made themselves or were put together by chance. How much less the wonderful mechanisms of nature? The very fact that the forces in nature's operations are immanent is all the more convincing proof of the wonderful intelligence and power of nature's Contriver.

3. Mere *evolution,* with its laws of natural selection and the survival of the fittest, is a sufficient explanation of the cosmos, including man. This is the argument of Materialism and Naturalistic Evolution.

Evolution, even if scientifically proven to be true, would demand a Supreme Intelligence back of the process to initiate and direct it; for nothing can be evolved that was not previously involved; and surely mere chance could not establish a regular order and *modus operandi.* Mere evolution explains nothing ultimate. It is not a power and intel-

ligence in itself; it is merely a mode of operation, a law of development. Such evolutionists as A. R. Wallace, Richard Owen, St. George Mivart, Asa Gray, Richard Dana and John Fiske maintained that Theism is the necessary postulate of evolution.[8]

4. *"Adaptation* is the *necessary law of existence."*

This again is a superficial mode of reasoning, for you might ask why it is so, even if it were the truth. But it is not true, for chaos might just as well exist as order, if there is no ordering Intelligence back of the world. The higher the organism the more difficult to produce and preserve. Any one can see that disorder would be much easier to produce than order. A well-known principle is that intelligence is always required to "bring order out of chaos." Again, the crucial question is, Why should blind chance want to produce a world at all, whether a chaos or a cosmos? On the other hand, if there is a God, we can easily see why He would create the universe. True science always seeks for the explanation that is adequate.

5. There are some things in nature that *do not have any apparent purpose,* and others that *do not seem to be wisely contrived.*

Admitting the above proposition to be true, we may well lay the emphasis on the words "apparent" and "seem." Our

8. While the author here contends that evolution, if proven to be true, would require a personal God as its originator and administrant, yet he is firmly convinced, as is shown elsewhere, that the hypothesis of evolution, whether theistic or naturalistic, has not been scientifically validated. Far from it. See his "Contending for the Faith," Chap. xiv; his "The Problem of Origins;" Fairhurst's "Theistic Evolution;" Graebner's "Evolution: An Investigation and a Criticism;" O'Toole's "The Case Against Evolution;" Morton's "The Bankruptcy of Evolution." Indeed, it seems to the author that the phrase, "Theistic Evolution," is a contradiction. See the reasons in a later chapter.

inability to see design, or the wisdom of design, does not disprove design, but simply proves our inability to perceive it. There are few things, however, in which we cannot see some wise purpose, especially if we take into account man's moral discipline.

A perfect world, one in which there were no trials and mysteries, certainly would not be well adapted to bring out the sturdy and heroic human virtues. There may be people to whom this argument makes no appeal, but that very token proves that their moral standards are not of a high order; that they would prefer an existence of mere pleasure (Epicureanism) to one that develops moral character.

Again, the general rule is that nature reveals design; we should not make the exceptions the rule. Still again, many things that once were supposed to be useless have in recent years been proven to have great utility. This would indicate that further progress in science may prove that all things have their use, and that it is part of God's design that men's minds shall be developed by their efforts to discover all His great and wise purposes.

Moreover, it has been good for man both mentally and morally to trust the wisdom and good will of the Power that is back of the Universe.

No doubt, too, the advent of sin introduced some confusion into the realm of nature just as it has brought discord into the human sphere. Pessimism — the philosophy of the daunted and discouraged — may see only the apparent defects in the cosmos; rational optimism sees the evils, but "trusts in God and does its best."

6. There are areas in the world where *chance seems to rule*. We speak of accidents, good luck, bad luck, chance, fortuity. These words connote reality, not mere fancy or

delusion. A hundred dice blocks thrown down haphazard would never fall in a straight row and in consecutive order. Rocks hurled from the crater of a volcano fall in great confusion upon the surrounding country.

To this objection we reply: There is just enough of a realm of apparent chance in the world to prove how utterly inadequate it would be to account for the innumerable evidences of design. The instances of chance simply accentuate the instances of order and purpose. In reality, however, there is no chance in the world; all is controlled by law; only in some cases the law does not come sufficiently within the range of human intelligence to enable us to see the evidences of its operation and the purpose of its Designer. Every dice block cast upon the floor falls into its place by the operation of inevitable laws, such as force, momentum, gravity, hardness, friction, etc. So with every rock hurled from a volcano.

One might put it thus: God gives us enough of a taste of chance to cause us to appreciate all the more fully the blessings of order and law.

We may, therefore, sum up the argument in this way: Design is evident in the cosmos; design connotes intelligence and will; intelligence and will connote personality; therefore the primal cause of the cosmos, with its order and design, must be a Person. This Person the Theist calls God.

VII. TELEOLOGY PROVES GOD TO BE ALL-WISE AND INFINTE.

1. The Denial of This Doctrine.

There are reasoners who concede that design connotes intelligence and personality, and therefore betokens a God back of the cosmos; but *they deny that it proves Him to be*

all-wise and infinite. They base their objections on the defects and imperfections in the natural and human realms. They also contend that the universe is not infinite—and this we grant; therefore its Maker need not be infinite—which we do not grant.[9]

2. Positive Argument in its Favor.

(1) The processes of the cosmos are so intricate, so complicated, so inconceivably numerous, so profound and mysterious, that the human mind almost spontaneously feels that the wisdom which invented and created all of them, and set them in operation, and now upholds them, must be infinite.

(2) In contriving and making the universe, with all its complexity and extent, the possible contingencies that might have arisen would demand an infinite intelligence to provide for all of them, and prevent any miscarriage of the vast and intricate plan.

(3) The universe is so vast, and therefore its ultimate purpose must be so far-reaching, as to require omniscience as its most reasonable ground. To contrive so vast a plan, and then to uphold all its infinitesimal parts in the great unity of the original design, would require a wisdom which, so far as we can see, would have to be infinite.

(4) To sustain the universe would require a God of infinite power; for, if He were not omnipotent, He would some time become exhausted in upholding it and it would plunge into ruin.

(5) If God is infinite in wisdom and power, it is reasonable to believe that He must be infinite in all His other attri-

9. The doctrine of a finite God, advocated by William James and H. G. Wells, will receive attention in a subsequent chapter.

butes; or, to put it still more cogently, it would be absurd to suppose that God could be infinite in two attributes and finite in His other attributes and in the essence of His being. Therefore the argument proves that God is an Infinite Being or Personality.

CHAPTER IV

COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

I. DEFINITIONS.

1. The *etymology* of the term cosmology: *Kosmos,* world, and *logos,* discourse. However, the derivation of the word does not give a real clue to the argument, and therefore the definition given below must be committed and understood.

2. Cosmos means a *world of order,* and is therefore the *antithesis of chaos.*

3. The *Cosmological Argument* is the argument that the cosmos is an effect produced by a Primal Cause, which, from the nature of the case, must be a Person.[1] Sometimes it is called the argument from causality, or from cause and effect.[2]

II. THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.

1. Statement.

Every effect and event must have an adequate cause. Some objection has been raised to the words "effect" and "cause" when thus connected, on the ground, as Valentine[3] says, that "then the proposition would involve only the self-evidence of verbal correlatives."

However, this mode of reasoning strikes us as vague and

1. Here consult the authors *in loco* in the first footnote for Chapter III.

2. Also called the Ætiological Argument from *aitia* cause, and *logos.*

3. "Natural Theology," p. 61.

abstruse. "Effect" and "cause" may be verbal correlatives, but "event" and "cause" are *essential* correlatives, and therefore the logical process is the same whether the word "event" or the word "effect" is used. The simple statement, "Every effect must have an adequate cause," at once impresses the normal mind as an axiomatic truth—one that stands in its own inherent right, and needs no more proof than the statement that two plus two equal four, or that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points.

Indeed, to our mind, the word "effect" is fitter than the word "event," for the mind at once grasps the simple idea of effect, while it must always make more or less effort to get the full concept of an event. The idea of an effect is simple, meaning a result of any kind, while that of an event is complex, involving always the connotation that it must be something that has had a beginning, something that has come into being where there was nothing of the kind before. Of course both forms of statement are true: "Every effect must have an adequate cause" and "Every event must have an adequate cause."

1. Proofs of the Principle.

(1) It is a *primary intuition of the human mind,* like an axiom in mathematics. This, on the face of it, is a strong reason for its acceptance without any attempt at logical demonstration.

(2) It is practically a *universal concept.* The only persons who profess to doubt it are those men who become confused by metaphysical speculations, and who, therefore, demand a logical proof for propositions that are known only by the mind's natural intuitions and not by logical processes. Even logic itself has no function unless it accepts as reliable the native human intuitions.

(3) The *science of the day* is all based on the fundamental proposition that effects are really caused. Whenever an effect is noted in the physical or the psychical realm, the scientist of today invariably seeks for its cause, and demands that the cause be adequate.[4]

(4) To hold that we *only imagine* a causal connection, when there is none, after all, is to assert that *man is afflicted with mental impotence;* that his mind is elementally false in its functioning. Kant's view that there is no real "nexus" between cause and effect makes human thought abortive. Hume and Mill, lost in speculations and depending only on logical processes, taught that there is only a time relation, only the relation of antecedent and consequent, between what we call cause and effect; but this is wrong for at least two reasons:

a. The mind intuitively concludes that there is a real producing force in the antecedent that precedes the effect; and why should not the intuitional faculty be as reliable as the logical faculty?

b. The mind cannot rest satisfied without asking the question why such and such consequences invariably follow such and such antecedents, if there is no causal relation between them. Surely mere parallelism and coincidence are not adequate explanations. We stand firmly on the basis of the universal intuitions, experiences and concepts of human thought.

IV. THE UNIVERSE AN EFFECT.

1. The universe is *real,* not imaginary. We have already presented our reasons for accepting the native intui-

4. Note as an example the interesting story of the discovery of Neptune in 1846 through the mathematical calculations of Adams and Le Verrier.

tions of the human mind.[5] Here we will simply state that the speculations of Kant and other advocates of the phenomenalistic school are not valid. Their contention is as follows: We do not know "things in themselves"—called *noumena*—but know only *phenomena*. Therefore the human mind may be so constructed that it imposes its own "forms of thought" upon phenomena, and thus we cannot be sure that its intuitions of outward reality are true to the facts. Things may not be at all what they seem. The phenomena apprehended by the mind may not correspond at all to the things themselves, because the mind may distort them by its own constitutional bent and make-up.

In reply we say, it is true that we do not know the essence of things, but only their phenomena. But why should not the phenomena give to the mind a true report of objective reality as far as the mind is able to comprehend it? Is the world based on false and illusive principles? There is no evidence that such is the case. Then why should it be assumed, or even imagined, that the human mind is afflicted with hallucination, so that it distorts objective reality, and does not, so far as it is endowed with the ability, apprehend things in their true aspects and relations?

Should it be said that we are often deceived by *mirages, ignes fatui,* and other mere appearances, we reply that we usually are able sooner or later to correct such illusions by discovering the reality in the case. Besides, if there were no objective reality, there would not even be a *mirage*.

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5. The problem of the nature and validity of knowledge, called Epistemology, is one of the outstanding problems of philosophy. It is treated searchingly and extensively in Dr. Samuel Harris's "The Philosophical Basis of Theism," Chapters II-VII. The reader is also referred to Hibben's clear exposition in his valuable work, "The Problems of Philosophy," Chapter VI.

Somewhere in the vicinity there must be the real landscape that is imaged on the rarified air. If you move toward the mirage, it will presently disappear, and you will know that it was an optical illusion; but if you see a *real* landscape and approach it, you will find it there. Thus human experience is able to distinguish between an illusion and a reality. If all the world were an illusion, no such distinction could be made.

Nothing is clearer, either, than that the human mind readily distinguishes between a mere coincidence and a real case of cause and effect. For instance, if two persons, without any previous understanding, should happen to meet at the intersection of two roads, we would say at once that it was simply a coincidence. However, if they should previously arrange by telephone to meet at that particular place, we would say the result was due to a real and adequate cause. What absurdity of reasoning it would be to attribute all antecedents and consequents to mere coincidence or fortuity!

Again, it is quite gratuitous to assume that the human mind is so constructed as to be *mal-apropos* to the cosmos in which it is placed. Being here, and being highly endowed with certain distinguishing qualities, it is much more reasonable to believe that it has been made to fit truly into the environment in which it has been placed. If it is not; if it is deluded in all its intuitions, or if it sees everything in distorted form, then the world, including man, is a hodge-podge, not a cosmos. Then, too, we might as well abandon all efforts at arriving at scientific and philosophical truth. In that case, too, the conclusions of skepticism and agnosticism would be just as unreliable. Let us cease to think altogether, if all our thinking is a delusion and a snare.

The philosophy of Idealism goes further than that of

mere phenomenalism (Kant and Comte), but we shall deal with it under its proper head in Part III of this work.

2. Being real, the *universe is finite, because* it is made up, as to its physical constitution, of finite parts, called atoms, aions or electrons; and no number of finite parts added together could ever reach infinity. The same proposition is true of the mental world; no addition of finite minds could ever aggregate an infinite mind. We think this statement self-evident. Yet the objection has been raised that an infinite number of parts added together would sum up infinity. But this is an unthinkable assumption, for you never could arrive at an infinite number of parts. The infinite belongs to a different category from the finite. It is not something that is either physical or partible. Moreover, if you even could add together an infinite number of minds, you would simply have that many different minds, not an infinite unitary mind. Therefore we maintain that the only tenable position is that the universe, however vast, is finite.

3. Being finite, the *universe must be dependent.* All its parts are found to be dependent; therefore as a whole it must be dependent.

4. Being finite and dependent, the *universe must have had a beginning;* for if it were eternal, it could not be finite and dependent. How could it be infinite in one way, that of eternity, and finite in other respects? Then, if it were eternal, it would be self-existent, for it never would have been brought into being; but we have already proved from its finity that it must be dependent as a whole and in all its parts.

5. If the universe is finite and dependent and had a beginning, its inception must have been an *effect* and an *event*

that demand an *adequate cause outside of itself*. An effect cannot be its own cause. The universe, therefore, could not be its own cause. This leads us logically to our next proposition.

V. THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

1. The Creator.

If the universe is finite and dependent or contingent and had a beginning, it must have been created. If there ever was a time when it was not, there is no thinkable way of its having been brought into being save by an act of creation. But creation demands a Creator.

2. The Creator the First Cause.

If the Creator of the universe was not the First Cause, He must have been created by another Creator; but we know nothing of one or more such intermediary beings. At all events, our thought must go back finally to the Primal Creator, for thought cannot rest in the idea of an infinite series of causes suspended on nothing. Such a conception spells nihilism of thought.

3. The First Cause Eternal and Uncaused.

There is something now—that is, something really exists at the present time. All the universe, including ourselves, is evidence of that fact. No normal mind will deny so self-evident a proposition. Now, if there ever was a time when there was nothing, nothing could have ever been. Therefore something must have always existed. From this it follows that the ultimate or primal Cause must be eternal and self-existent, the uncaused Cause of all other existences.

4. The First Cause a Person.

(1) The creation of the universe must have been a *free,*

voluntary act, not a coerced one. It is unreasonable to believe that the eternal, self-existent, independent First Cause should have been compelled by anything in Himself to create a world; and of course there was nothing outside of Himself yet in existence to coerce Him. Therefore we maintain that the creation of the universe must have been a free act of the Creator; but freedom can be predicated only of a rational personality, never of a mere thing; therefore the First Cause (or the Creator) must be a Person.

(2) The universe is a *cosmos, evincing order and design* in its constitution; but order and design connote intelligence and freedom, and intelligence and freedom connote personality. Therefore the cosmos demands a Person as its only adequate Cause.

(3) *Human beings are part of the cosmos,* and they are *persons.* The only adequate cause for such an effect is a First Cause who is a Person. How could personalities ever have sprung from an impersonal source? Remember we are seeking for the scientific principle of an adequate cause for all events and effects.

(4) Human personalities—a very important part of the universe—have *self-consciousness, freedom, morality, and spirituality.* The only cause adequate to produce these personal qualities must be a personal Creator. Let us remember that human personalities are phenomena of the highest order. High results demand a high cause—one that is adequate. To asign a cause that is insufficient is contrary to the scientific methods and temper of the day.

5. The First Cause Infinite.

(1) If the Creator were not infinite, there would be *something greater than He*—that is, infinity—and He would not, after all, be the First Cause, self-existent and eternal.

(2) If the Creator were not infinite in *power,* He would sometime become *exhausted* in sustaining the universe.

(3) If He were not infinite in *wisdom,* a *contingency* might sometime arise for which He was not prepared, and that would hurl Himself and the universe to ruin.

(4) If He were not infinite in *love, justice,* and *self-control,* He would sometime do *wrong,* and that would bring about His own destruction and that of His universe.

(5) The *number of possible contingencies* in so vast a universe would demand that its Maker and Preserver be infinite in *all His attributes.* The principle of causality requires an infinite personal Being back of all the data and phenomena of the universe.

VI. AN OBJECTION STATED AND REFUTED.

1. The Objection.

It is just as difficult to account for God as for the material universe. Therefore why not accept the hypothesis that the universe itself is eternal, self-existent and uncaused?

2. The Refutation.

Something now exists; therefore something must have always existed. If there ever was a time when nothing existed, nothing could have ever come into existence. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.*

Now, is it not more reasonable to believe that the primal entity was an ordering Mind rather than a mere blind force? Place God back of the universe, and you have assigned an adequate cause and explanation of the universe and all its varied phenomena. Deny God's existence, and you have no adequate explanation of the existence of a single atom, to say nothing of all the various forms of life, intelligence,

morality and spiritual belief and experience. You are plunged into intellectual, moral and spiritual agnosticism. Your science and philosophy break to pieces at their very fountain head. You have a universe without an adequate cause.

Therefore the Cosmological Argument, based on the sound scientific and philosophic principle of causality, demands a personal God back of the cosmos as the only adequate cause of its being and diversified phenomena; therefore it is the only scientific hypothesis.

CHAPTER V
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

I. DEFINITION.

1. Etymology of the Term.

It is derived from *ontos,* being, and *logos,* discourse. The etymology, however, does not in itself give a clear idea of the precise form of the argument in Theism.

2. Meaning of the Term as Used in Theism.

The Ontological Argument is the argument that is based on the *idea possessed by the human mind of a perfect and absolute Being.*[1]

II. HISTORICAL SKETCH.

1. The germs of the argument are found in Plato, who taught that our minds, in examining the cosmos, discover the evidence of ideas. If they were not there, our minds would not find them. Hence, he reasoned, there must be a Mind back of the cosmos whose ideas are reflected in its constitution and order.

2. The argument was first elaborated and put into syllogistic form by Anselm (1093-1109 A. D.), who was its first real proponent and defender. The Anselmic form of the argument is given with slight modification under III below.

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1. See footnote 1, Chapter III, and consult the several authors *in loco,* especially Valentine, Orr and Micou.

3. It was further developed and modified by Descartes, Butler, Cousin, Leibnitz, and Sir William Hamilton.

4. In the most recent times it has been acutely advocated in revised form by Dorner, Valentine, Orr, Fisher, Harris, Lindsay and Micou.

III. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT.

1. The mind possesses the idea of the perfect and absolute Being;

2. Existence is a necessary attribute of such a Being, or He would not be perfect and absolute;

3. Therefore such a Being must exist.

IV. CRITICISM OF THE ARGUMENT.

The first and second statements are true as separate statements; but they are not related to each other as the major and minor premises of a syllogism, because the *existence* of a being is not necessarily included in the *idea* of a being. The mere idea of a thing does not necessitate or connote its existence. You may imagine a Centaur, but you know that such a creature has no existence; it is purely a creature of the fancy. True, the idea of a perfect and absolute Being is a unique idea, as we shall show later; yet even then we must admit that the above threefold statement is not a true syllogism, and hence does not carry conviction to most minds. The very fact that few persons follow the reasoning and feel its force proves that it is at least obscure; that there is a dark place somewhere in the argument. Compare it with a true logical syllogism, and note the difference:

1. All men are mortal;
2. John Jones is a man;
3. Therefore John Jones is mortal.

Here we see that the man mentioned in the minor premise belongs to the class named in the major premise. For that reason the conclusion is inevitable. However, the same relation does not subsist between the major and minor premises in the Ontological Argument.

V. VALUE OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT.

When properly stated, however, the argument has real value, even if it does not have convincing force. To some classes of minds it makes a very distinct appeal, while to a few it is regarded as the crowning proof of the divine existence. Let us note how far its validity extends.

1. The idea of a perfect, absolute Being is, after some thought, found to be a *necessary idea* of the human mind. It is not a pure intuition, but follows necessarily from certain postulates of human thinking and experience, such as the following: having the idea of the relative, which all of us have, we cannot help thinking of the absolute; so the idea of the dependent implies the idea of the independent; the derived the idea of the undrived; all effects and events the idea of an original uncaused Cause. We know that the relative, dependent and derived exist, for we see them all about us, and realize that we belong to the same category. But the moment you think of contingent matters, that moment you get an inevitable conception of the ultimate uncontingent ground and basis of them all.

Now, note: If the perfect and absolute Being does not exist, our necessary ideas are false, and our minds have been so constructed as to delude us. On the other hand, if the perfect and absolute Being really exists, our necessary ideas have a true basis, and the mind, when it functions fundamentally, may be trusted. Herein lies the singular force of this argument—that the idea of the perfect Being

is a *necessary* idea of the human mind, whereas the idea of an imaginary or a finite being, is not a necessary one.

2. Let us now put the Ontological Argument in its *proper syllogistic form:*

Major Premise: The human mind possesses the necessary idea of a perfect and absolute Being.

Minor Premise: Existence is a necessary attribute of such a Being.

Conclusion: Ergo, such a Being must exist, *or* our necessary ideas are null and void.

You will observe that the legitimacy of the argument rests on the contingency of the *or* in the conclusion. On the ground that the intuitions and normal inferences of the human mind are valid and trustworthy, the method of reasoning is convincing. None but phenomenalists will question it; and they, judged by their own theories of knowledge, cannot trust the validity of their own questioning.

3. The Ontological Argument may be combined with the Cosmological with singular force as follows:

We have the idea of the perfect and absolute Being; and it comes to us, not as a freak of the imagination, but either as an intuition or a necessary inference. If no such Being exists, whence came the idea of Him to the human mind? How could it ever have arisen in human thought? Nothing can rise higher than its source; therefore the only adequate explanation of our necessary idea of a perfect Being is the existence of that Being as the source and cause of the idea.

CHAPTER VI

MORAL ARGUMENT

I. DEFINITION.

The Moral Argument is the proof of the divine existence which is based on the *moral constitution of man and the moral order of the world.*[1]

II. RELATION TO COSMOLOGY.

There is a sense in which the Moral Argument might be regarded as a division of the Cosmological Argument. The latter seeks to find the adequate cause for the cosmos, of which moral facts and phenomena are an integral part. Thus it might be thought that, in seeking for the adequate cause of morality, we are dealing purely and simply with the Cosmological Argument. However, there are reasons why we believe the Moral Argument is sufficiently distinctive to deserve a place as a major division in our theistic system, co-ordinate with the other outstanding proofs. They are the following:

1. Cosmology deals more largely with the cosmos as a physical system, and touches only incidentally on moral phenomena.

2. The cardinal thought in the Cosmological Argument is the view of the universe as *contingent, finite and dependent,* and therefore as demanding a personal, self-existent

1. See footnote 1, Chapter III, and compare the several authors *in loco.* On this thesis Valentine, Balfour, Micou and Snowden are especially cogent.

and eternal Cause to bring it into being and to sustain it in all its parts and relations. The moral order of the world would not, therefore, belong elementally to this conception.

3. The ethical phenomenon is *so unique* in its very idea, involving conscience, freedom and moral distinctions, that it may well claim a place that is all its own among the theistic evidences.

4. Morality is so *large, important and vital* a fact in the world of humanity, and is so decisive for human welfare, that it should not be assigned a minor place in a system of Theism. In making evaluations, moral data are of more importance than all the physical facts of the universe. The physical has been made for the moral and spiritual, not the reverse. The *summum bonum* is ethical being and achievement, not merely pleasure and utility, whether physical or psychical. Even our highest conception of God must be that He is an ethical Being. Note the Trisagion of the Bible: "Holy, holy, holy art thou, Lord God Almighty."

III. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT.

1. Man's Moral Nature.

(1) That man has a moral constitution scarcely needs argument. He has a conscience faculty that discerns moral distinctions, creates a moral imperative within him, and gives him a sense of responsibility to the law over him and the moral Personality back of the law. True joy comes to him only from right being and conduct; never from wrong. Moreover, the ethical phenomenon is practically universal. There are no nations on the earth which do not have some sense of right and wrong. This fact is writ large on the human constitution everywhere.

(2) Among ethicists there are differences of opinion as

to the origin and nature of conscience, some holding that it is a distinct power of the human soul, innate and divinely implanted; others maintain that it is an acquired power, the result of accumulated experiences. However, this diversity of view does not invalidate the *fact* of conscience, for, whatever may be its genesis, it persists everywhere in recognizing moral distinctions, and is perhaps the most dominating factor in human life, especially in moulding the true character and securing the real advancement of the human race.

(3) The fact of diversity of moral judgments among men does not nullify conscience or moral distinctions. That there is such variety must be admitted. Some tribes have practices that they regard as right, but that other nations condemn as entirely unethical. Even different individuals in civilized lands often subscribe to different moral codes, some condemning what others approve.

However, the *fundamental or primary fact of moral distinctions still persists.* The differences are only in the sphere of secondary moral judgments, not in the elemental realm of morality. There are no nations which utterly wipe out the difference between right and wrong. Even the pagan mother who sacrifices her babe to appease the gods does this because she thinks it is right. As soon as her moral judgment is corrected by Christian teaching, she ceases her heathen practice, and rejoices in the higher light that has broken into her benighted mind. This proves that, however moral judgments may be obscured, the primary facts of moral distinctions and of a cognizing moral faculty still remain intact.

It should also be remembered that many tribes have very erroneous ideas of scientific facts. This does not prove that the human mind has no scientific faculty, nor that

there is no true basis for science in the cosmos. Indeed, it cannot be denied that some tribes which have exceedingly crude idea of physical science, yet possess surprisingly high moral standards. It is said that the virtue of the Zulu women puts to shame the low standards of sexual virtue that frequently obtain in so-called civilized and highly scientific communities.[2]

(4) That moral judgments are capable of improvement does not destroy the moral faculty in man. All man's faculties are imperfectly developed in the immature state, and must be cultivated. Nobody holds that, on this account, man has no intellectual powers.

(5) Sometimes it is objected that conscience, after all, is not an infallible guide even in its own sphere, that of morality; which proves, the opponent asserts, that conscience is not an innate power of the human mind. But the argument is not valid. No human faculty is infallible even in its distinct sphere. Sense perception is not infallible in cognizing the objective world; the logical faculty is not infallible in pursuing its praxis; the scientific faculty is liable to err; the memory is imperfect; so with all the psychical powers. Yet no one, because of this general fallibility, denies the reality of man's mental make-up and its several functioning powers.

(6) That a distinct moral faculty is native to the human mind is evident from the unique character of its perceptions and feelings. Moral phenomena are *sui generis*. Ethics deals with a distinct sphere—that of right and wrong, which is different from the spheres of the physical, the purely pleasurable and utilitarian, the logical, the scientific, the esthetic. The question, "Is it right?" is the problem of ethics,

2. Valentine, "Theoretical Ethics," p. 44.

and differs in kind, and not merely in degree or quality, from all other questions.

Now, conscience is the specialized faculty for discerning this peculiar body of facts, namely, the ethical phenomena, the right and the wrong.

The ethical emotions are also distinct from those that are stirred by any other psychical cognitions, being the feelings of ought, duty, moral approval, moral aversion, guilt and remorse. When you say, "I feel that such course is right," you delimit that feeling from every other feeling of which you are capable. All these facts prove conclusively that man has a moral constitution and a specific moral faculty or functioning power.

(7) The outstanding and paramount character of moral phenomena help to prove the reality of man's moral nature. All true progress and civilization depend upon the recognition of moral distinctions and the practice of moral principles. Society itself could not cohere without such recognition and practice. Human government is based largely on the fact that man has an innate power of distinguishing between right and wrong. Otherwise all penal sanctions would be vain and foolish.

(8) It is not likely that man would have been framed in a cosmos where moral phenomena are so universal, dominant and vitally important without being endued with a special faculty for apprehending them. In other ways he is wonderfully fitted into the cosmical order; so it is reasonable to believe that he is adapted to the moral order, and it is unreasonable to think that he is not.

(9) At this place we cannot enter the discussion of the doctrine of the freedom of the will; we must be content to say that universal consciousness attests that the human will

has the power of choice; that man is not merely an automaton. This being true, the fact of freedom of choice connotes that man must be a moral being, with the power to elect either right or wrong. Therefore, he must have a faculty to discern the difference and antagonism between them.

2. The Moral Order of the World.

(1) No matter how we explain it, there is a power in the universe "that makes for righteousness." It may not always appear on the surface, but profounder study of nature in its relation to human life and history always discloses the truth. We see virtue rewarded, and applaud it; crime punished, and sanction it. History has a way of vindicating the right even though sometimes tardily. No bad man is ever honored long by succeeding generations, whereas the men who have wrought for right principles are held in grateful esteem. "The memory of the righteous is blessed; but the name of the wicked shall rot" (Prov. 10:7).

(2) Society and government are based on a moral order; otherwise, they could not exist.

(3) There are also natural consequences of right and wrong conduct, thus proving a moral order. The debauchee sooner or later suffers the consequences of his immoral life, and he and others recognize his sufferings as condign retribution. On the other hand, the physically virtuous man is free from those sufferings which are intuitively regarded as penal. If he must suffer pain, it is generally looked upon as a natural consequence or a disciplinary measure, and not as a punitive affliction. And when sufferings are visited upon the innocent, men usually feel that it is a temporary wrong for which ample compensation will be made in the future life, when equity and justice shall prevail; when

there shall be "new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness" (*2* Pet. 3:13).

(4) The world (and this includes both the natural and the human realms) is so constituted as to give man constant opportunity to choose between right and wrong. For example, here are two paths which a man may pursue—the one may lead to the house of sin, the other to the house of worship. The man has the power of option between the two. What stronger proof could there be that the natural realm is so constituted as to furnish man an arena for moral action and achievement?

3. A Moral Economy Demands a Personal Creator and Governor.

(1) The moral could never have sprung from the non-moral merely by means of natural or resident forces. That would violate the fundamental law of causality.

(2) Moral qualities can be predicated only of persons. Men never assign moral attributes to mere things or animals. Rational personality alone can constitute moral agency. Hence the ultimate ground of all moral data must be a Person—God.

(3) Man's feeling of responsibility connotes a personal Being to whom he is amenable. Man cannot have a sense of responsibility merely to an abstract law, if there is no lawgiver and executor back of it. Think of the absurdity of a man saying, "I feel that I must some day give an account to the laws of nature!" Much more rational and profound is the teaching of a great ethical book: "So then every one of us shall give account of himself unto God" (Rom. 14:12).

(4) The injustice and inequality now so apparent in the

world demand an all-wise and righteous Being who will some time right every wrong and usher in the ultimate triumph and reign of truth and justice. Without such a belief men must conclude that they live in a world of insoluble riddles, without hope that they shall ever be deciphered. Such pessimism and hopelessness do not agree with the almost universal feeling of a golden age to come. Moreover, it would not agree with the patent fact that the world is a cosmos, that it has a moral order, and that man, its chief denizen, is an ethical being.

(5) A profound philosopher like Kant, who could not appreciate the force of the other theistic arguments, was convinced of the divine existence through the Moral Argument. The gist of his teaching was this: Man's conscience feels the moral imperative within it and over it, and this so powerfully that it cannot be evaded; but a moral imperative connotes an objective moral law; an objective moral law can be accounted for only by a real moral Personality who is its ground, source, author and administrant. To the man who has not stultified his conscience by wrong thinking or wrong doing, or both, the argument of the great critical philosopher must be convincing.

(6) Theism affords an adequate explanation of the moral phenomena of the world. In positing an infinite and perfect moral Personality back of the universe as its Creator and Ruler, we certainly assign a sufficient cause for all moral data and developments. No other conception is adequate. Surely Materialism, Pantheism and Agnosticism are not adequate. Therefore, Theism is the only scientific hypothesis.

(7) In order to be as thoroughgoing as possible, we must here take note of an objection that the skeptic is likely

to raise: There is wrong in the world as well as right, immorality as well as morality. Must not wrong, therefore, have an eternal basis in fact? How could it ever have appeared if it is not eternal in seminal form?

Reply: Right and wrong are not *entities,* but *qualities.* And they are qualities of certain kinds of entities, namely, of rational personalities. Now right is a positive quality; therefore, as soon as there is a rational person, he must be a moral being, if there is to be a moral economy; and we have already proved that the world is such an economy. However, wrong, being only a negative quality, that is, the negation of the right, it is not a *necessary* quality of a personal being. In a moral universe the wrong is only an eternal *possibility,* and is contingent on the choice of a free being. A being who is not free would not be an ethical being; he would be a machine, an automaton. As a free being, it is *possible* for him to sin, but not *necessary;* for were it necessary, he would not be a free being.

Thus we see that wrong is not necessarily *existent* from eternity, but is only a *possibility contingent on free choice* —a possibility which God never desired should become an actuality, but which He could not prevent by force and yet leave man a moral agent. In this principle lies the uniqueness of ethical facts; they are dependent on the initiating power of free will; otherwise there could be no morality.

Let us illustrate. In a certain class-room there is good order. Does not that very fact, however, connote the possibility of disorder? But disorder is something that ought not to be made actual; it ought to remain only a possibility. Again, suppose a student stands at the blackboard solving a problem in mathematics. There is a correct way of solving it; but that fact connotes the possibility of error. However, he should avoid bringing the error into actuality. Just

so in the moral sphere—except that a moral error is a great deal more serious than a merely intellectual error.

So we say that the right, the moral, since it is a positive quality or attribute, must be an eternal fact dwelling in a moral personality, or it never could have brought forth a moral cosmos with moral beings; but the wrong or the immoral was only an eternal possibility, which should never have been converted into actuality.

Should the objection be made that the eternal moral Personality—God—might have prevented the entrance of sin into the universe, we reply: He could have done so only by destroying the freedom of the moral agents He had created, or by refraining from creating moral agents at all. Since man is in the world, and is a moral agent, we know that God created moral agents. We must conclude, therefore, that, in His wisdom, He knew that it was better to create moral beings than mere happy automata or mere material mechanisms. Since moral excellence is the noblest kind of excellence, the true ethicist cannot help approving God's choice and permission. The man who says that God should not have made moral agents, but only automatically happy beings, proves by that very token that he has extremely crass moral ideas. He is an opportunist and an epicurean, and should blush to advertise his ethical crudity.[3]

4. Moral Influence of Theism.

(1) Truth promotes human welfare; error blights it.

3. A kindly reviewer of the first edition of this book seemed to think that, in our theodicy, we did not try to justify God for permitting sin to come into the universe. We think that the above section presents a sufficient justification and the only one that is possible. The subject is further dealt with in Chap. XV of this book. A theodicy is "a vindication of the justice of God in permitting natural and moral evil" (Webster).

If Theism is found to be useful in the highest sense of the term, as it is, that fact is a cogent argument in its favor.

(2) Belief in a God to whom men realize that they are responsible and who takes pleasure in right doing and feels displeasure in wrong doing, must act as an incentive to virtue and a deterrent to vice. History and experience prove that the clearer and stronger the belief in a personal God has been, the more salutary have been the results.

(3) While atheism or agnosticism may construct some sort of an ethical system, it is most conspicuous for its failure, as, for example, Herbert Spencer's "Data of Ethics," where the ideas of right and wrong are resolved into mere utility and pleasure. Any system that thus interprets the ethical principles of the world would surely lower the standard of ethical practice, should it be generally accepted.

(4) As a matter of fact, atheism leads to laxity of morals with individuals and communities. The atheists of a neighborhood are never its moral glory and inspiration; they never help to bring about true moral reforms, but are more apt to oppose them. The terrors of the French revolution might be taken as an example. Anarchists, nihilists, and other "dangersous classes" are almost invariably atheistic.[4] On the other hand, the men who have really turned the currents of history and civilization upward have almost to a man been earnest and whole-hearted theists. As a rule, they have appealed to God to aid them in their unselfish moral endeavors.

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4. Goldwin Smith: "The denial of the existence of God and of a future state is, in a word, the dethronement of conscience." Although this statement is cited in a footnote in Chapter I, it is quoted here again on account of its relevancy. According to the published creed of the Bolshevists, they might be included in the "dangerous classes."

(5) If theists have ever been guilty of crimes, it was because they held gross and unethical conceptions of God. The history of the world furnishes scarcely an exception to the rule that men who have earnestly believed in the divine Being as the good and holy God to whom they were responsible have been men of upright and benevolent character. One might cite Moses, Samuel, Paul, and, in a still higher degree, Christ Himself, who believed in God and sought to do His will.

CHAPTER VII

ESTHETICAL ARGUMENT

I. DEFINITION.

The Esthetical Argument is the argument for the divine existence which is based on the presence of beauty and sublimity in the universe.[1]

II. THE FACT OF BEAUTY.

1. In Nature.

There are beauty and sublimity in the natural realm. Let it be freely admitted that there is much in nature that is ugly and repulsive; much that is dreary and monotonous; much that can be called neither attractive nor repellent. Yet, on the other hand, many parts of the natural realm are truly and even exquisitely lovely: the green of field, meadow and foliage; the variegated flowers; the undulating landscapes; the rivers and lakes sparkling in the sunshine; the glorious sunsets; the exquisite tinting of the plumage of many birds, especially of tanagers, hummingbirds and birds of Paradise; mountain scenery; the glory of the hills and valleys. All nature might have been made humdrum, but for some reason much of it has been arrayed in beauty and grandeur, and these attributes are adapted to

1. An eloquent chapter on the argument from the beautiful is found in Micou's "Basic Ideas in Religion." A. J. Balfour has also employed this proof with singular force and delicacy of style in his "Theism and Humanism."

stir a responding chord in the mind of man, causing him interest and delight.

2. In the Human Physique.

No people appreciated the beauty of the human face and form more than did the Greeks, as their many works of art testify. The Venus de Milo is said to be the most truthful and beautiful replica of the female form. The Apollo Belvedere is the classic representation of masculine beauty. It may be freely admitted, that there are many people who are far from attractive, while others are repulsive; yet there is much physical attractiveness among men, women and children. We may well ask why there is physical human beauty at all. Such beauty also strikes a responsive chord in the mind of man.

3. In Human Art.

(1) The productions of human skill in drawing, painting and sculpturing all bear witness to the fact there is a large element of the esthetic in the world. Man might have been so constituted as to drag out a monotonous existence without such a means of delight and exhilaration.

(2) Literature also betokens an element of beauty in the world. True, much writing is prosaic enough, and "of the making of books there is no end." However, there are such factors as literary art, the beauty of style, the smoothness of diction, the exquisite turning of phrases, the delight of pure simplicity and limpidness, the rhyme of poetry, the thrill of beautiful thought. Such appreciation is writ large on the human soul. We may well ask why.

(3) In no human efforts is the fact of beauty more clearly evinced than in music. Listen to the sweet and simple melody; to the soul-stirring oratorio; to the sweep-

ing orchestra. Man might have been made without this capacity. Why was music put into his soul?[2]

III. MAN'S ESTHETIC FACULTY.

To correspond with, and respond to, the beauty in the world, *man has an esthetic capacity.* His eye sees the marvelous colors on the evening sky, or the profound depths of the starlit dome at night, and there is something in his soul that appreciates. His eye alone could not feel such a thrill and uplift. He feels that it is a spiritual emotion.

The same is true of his delight in all forms of beauty. While there are persons who are unresponsive to the appeal of beauty, there are multitudes whose chief pleasure in life is admiration of beauty in its varied forms and phenomena. The horse and dog, however intelligent in other ways, show no appreciation of beauty, though they may at times be frightened by the terrible. Stand with your well-trained family horse on a hilltop, and try to interest him in the glory of the sunset; you will find that, if he notes it at all, he has no means of showing his appreciation. He has not been endued with the esthetic faculty.

IV. THE RATIONAL INFERENCE.

1. Evidence of Design.

Since so much beauty and grandeur mark the universe, and since man has an innate esthetic taste to match them, the rational conclusion is that the cosmical beauty and man's taste must have been designed to complement each other. If this is not true, the universe has not been constructed on rational principles. Then how can it be a cosmos instead

2. We also speak of moral beauty, by which we mean true moral excellence and symmetry. This constitutes the connecting link between Ethics and Esthetics, another proof that the world is a cosmos.

of a chaos? And how can it be intelligible to reason? However, if there was intentionality in fitting together the beauty of the cosmos and man's esthetic faculty, that fact connotes intelligence and will, which in turn connote personality. Therefore, the designer must be a Person—God.

2. Evidence of Beneficent Design.

The universe might have been created a dreary waste, and man might have been created without esthetic appreciation. But how dull and monotonous would have been his existence! For what other reason, then, could beauty have been added to the cosmos than for man's delight? For what other reason could his taste for the beautiful have been given him? But such a purpose connotes, not only a personal Designer, but also a beneficent Designer. Hence reason again leads us back to God.

3. Evidence of Divine Love of the Beautiful.

There is much beauty in the world that is never seen by man. "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen," etc. In most out-of-the-way localities there is most exquisite beauty, and doubtless has been for centuries, for the moment man discovers it unexpectedly, it is there in its completeness, not adding to its pristine beauty because of his presence. How many rare flowers have bloomed and perished; how many lovely shells and plants have existed for centuries at the bottom of the sea; how many consummately beautiful birds have lived and died;[3] how many delicately tinted sunsets have flamed and faded—all of them before a human eye could behold them and a human soul rejoice in them!

3. It is said that there are about three hundred species of hummingbirds in South America, many of them exquisitely beautiful; yet most of them dwell in the most remote regions among the Andes.

Why all this unnoted beauty? Ah! was it unnoted? What is its *rationale?* Was it merely an age-long waste? Was so much beauty created without a purpose? Suppose we simply assume that there is a Creator and Preserver who, like ourselves, loves the beautiful in all its forms, would not that assumption offer a rational explanation of all the phenomenal beauty and magnificence there are in the world? If this is not the true explication, there is none that is rational and adequate. Hence both teleology and cosmology point indubitably to a personal Creator and Sustainer.

Many objects that seem to be repellent to human ken at first are found, on closer investigation, to be rarely fascinating. Look at a toad's skin through a microscope, and note that it sparkles with gems of many facets. The same is true of a common pebble. The skin of the serpent is set with many diamonds. Perhaps when we come to see nature "face to face," we shall find that all her forms are beautiful. Even the atoms and electrons, and the universal ether itself, may be made with rarely beautiful forms and colored with exquisite tints. Who knows but this may be the meaning of the New Testament Apocalypse, which speaks of the jasper walls, gates of pearl, golden streets, river and tree of life, and alabaster throne of the New Jerusalem?

However that may be, the rational explanation of the unseen beauty in the world is that God Himself sees and appreciates it. Add to this the arguments in the preceding sections, namely, that God endowed man with the esthetic faculty to mate with the beauty in nature, and you have ample reason for believing in a beneficent and beauty-loving Ordainer; and reason, too, that is founded, not merely on sentiment, but also on scientific processes of thought.

4. Purpose of the Repulsive.

(1) The skeptic is apt to raise the objection that there is much in the world that is disagreeable. Hence, passing by the beautiful and sublime in the world, he sees only the offensive, becomes pessimistic, and either denies that there is a God, or questions His goodness and love.[4] It may be frankly admitted that the presence of the offensive in the world, and that in large amounts, is in many respects a mystery; and perhaps no explanation can be given that will satisfy all minds. Yet so many ameliorating explanations of the difficulty may be given that there is no good reason to become atheistic or pessimistic over the problem.

(2) The commonplace accentuates the interesting, and the repellent brings out more sharply the beautiful. Whatever might be the case in a perfect world, tenanted by perect people, we know that in the world as it is now constituted we have a keener appreciation of the beautiful because of the presence of the opposite. After riding on the train for hours over the monotonous plains of the West, how you exclaim with delight when you suddenly come upon an irrigated area gleaming in rich and variegated hues in the sun! Formed as we are, therefore, we appreciate beauty all the more by way of contrast.

(3) After all, as has been said (section 3 above), all things may be beautiful in their essence, even the universal ether, the electrons and the atoms. It may be that it is only the temporary functioning and condition of some parts of nature that are offensive in our present limited status.

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4. In reading the writings of present-day infidels, we note that most of them are atheists; and they base their atheistic principles on the harsh and seemingly untoward phenomena in the natural realm.

(4) There is very likely a moral purpose in the disagreeable and difficult. Object as we will to the present order of the world, we know that many of the finest, and especially the sturdiest and most heroic, virtues are possible only in a world of struggle. Certainly if all nature were beautiful, pleasant and prolific in itself, there would be no chance to develop the noble virtues of diligence, bravery, patience, initiative and enterprise. Morally all men would be weak and supine.

Now, if moral excellence is the highest quality in the world, men ought not to find fault with the very *regime* that gives opportunity for its achievement. Therefore it would seem that the Creator, being a moral Being Himself and desiring His world to be a moral economy, was profoundly wise in making the cosmos just as it is — with enough of the good and the beautiful to stimulate man, and prevent his being daunted and overcome, and yet enough of the hard and unbeautiful to test and discipline his moral powers. Will the skeptic tell us what kind of an economy could have accomplished this purpose so effectively as the present one?

(5) On theistic grounds there is a sure hope that some time the problem of the commonplace and repellent will, like all the other puzzling problems of our mundane existence, be solved; for if there is a God who is good and beneficent, He will not forever leave the deep questions of the soul unanswered.

On the other hand, the atheist and materialist have no such prospect. According to their theory, all men will sooner or later die and sink into eternal oblivion. Here the words of a great Book are most reassuring: "Now we see in a glass darkly; but then face to face: now we know in part; but

then we shall know even also as we are known" (1 Cor. 13:12).

5. Purpose of the Sublime.

A few words should be added on this phase of our subject. Nature is sometimes grandly beautiful; she stirs within us feelings of reverence, worship and awe. The Alpine heights, the deep cañons, the majestic sweep of the storm, the glory of the starlit heavens at night—all beget within us these noble emotions. Now what is the obvious purpose of the sublime in nature? Is it not to stir in man's soul the emotions that have been mentioned? Can any other purpose be named? At all events, that purpose is accomplished, and man is made better and happier thereby.

If such is the purpose of the sublime in the universe, there must have been a personal Creator who held the purpose in mind and carried it out in the structure of the world. Who knows but that the Psalmist assigned the highest possible reason for sublimity and majesty in the universe when he exclaimed: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork" (Ps. 19:1)?

Yes; if the universe is constructed on a rational plan at all, and is not merely an idle and purposeless mechanism, the argument for the divine existence from the sublime and the beautiful is vindicated. The alternatives of a rational universe or an irrational one are set before every thinker, and he must make his choice.

PART III

ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES[1]

CHAPTER VIII

ATHEISM AND MATERIALISM

I. DEFINITIONS.

1. Of Atheism.

Atheism is the teaching that there is no God. It is mere negation, and therefore is not a science or philosophy.

2. Of Materialism.

Materialism is the teaching that the only entity is material substance.

3. Distinction between Atheism and Materialism.

Materialism is simply the positive pole of Atheism; in addition to the mere negation of the divine existence, Materialism asserts positively that the only entity is material substance, which is the source, basis and explanation of all things. It is pure materialistic monism. All materialists are atheists, and most atheists who make any positive assertions are materialists; hence in confuting the errors of the one class we confute those of the other.

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1. The classical work on all these defective world-views is Flint's "Anti-Theistic Theeories." No less forceful are the works of Sheldon, Harris, Fisher, Orr, Stirling, Miscou, Pringle-Pattison and Snowden.

II. ERRORS OF MATERIALISM.[2]

1. It is Superficial.

It stops with material substance, whereas thought can readily go back further—to a Supreme Personal God, who is the intelligent Creator and Preserver. But further back than Theism thought cannot travel without being lost in an unending series resting on nothing. The *ultima thule* of human thinking is the self-existent, personal Being we call God.

2. Based on Chance.

If there is nothing but material substance; if there is no creative and superintending Intelligence back of the universe, it must be a mere *happen-so,* a mere fortuitous concourse of things and events. But the world is a cosmos, not a chaos. How could chance produce a world whose most dominating principle is that of order and law? That would be tantamount to bringing something out of nothing. It would make the effect greater than the cause.[3]

3. Opposed to Universal Belief.

All nations are theistic. There is not a nation or tribe that is atheistic. If there is no God, nothing but material substance, how does it occur that almost all men believe in God, or, at least, in supernatural beings? Could mere material substance, by means of mere resident forces, ever produce even the idea of God? How much less so universal and dominant an idea, so persistent a conviction! If ma-

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2. Consult the following: Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 42-77; Orr, "The Christian View of God and the World," pp. 142-150, 402, 403; Fisher, "The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief," pp. 68-72; Christlieb, "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief," pp. 145-161; Micou, "Basic Ideas in Religion," pp. 207-229, and other references; Harris, "The Philosophic Basis of Theism," pp. 428-554 (profound).

3. See Micou, *ut supra,* pp. 213f.

terial substance causes all men to believe there is a God when there is none, then material substance must be a universal falsifier.

4. Materialism makes the World Eternal.

The world cannot be eternal and uncreated for three reasons:

(1) It is finite, contingent and dependent, because all its parts are so, as we have shown in a previous thesis, and therefore it cannot be self-existent, absolute and eternal.

(2) It is a developing universe, so declared to be by the science of the day; therefore it must have had a beginning, because if it were eternal and yet developing, it should have reached its present status long ago, for it had eternity in which to unfold and progress. That which develops must have had a beginning; only that which is perfect and self-existent can be eternal. Therefore in attributing eternity to the material world, Materialism is irrational.

3. The science of the day goes back to beginnings, and finds them. It teaches that there was a time when man, animals and vegetables began to be; when the present form of the universe had its genesis. Reasoning by analogy, we may conclude that material substance itself did not always exist, but had a beginning in time.

5. Materialism Unscientific and Inadequate.

It offers no adequate explanation of the advent of the following phenomena of the universe: Matter, force, life, sentiency, consciousness, freedom, morality, spirituality. These are the outstanding facts, those that are crucial in working out a philosophy. A hypothesis that does not afford an adequate solution of any of the paramount problems raised by the human mind is surely neither scientific nor philosophical. It fails precisely where it ought to show

its strength and sufficiency. Compare the hypothesis of Theism, which offers an adequate explanation of all the facts and phenomena of the universe, because it places a sufficient foundation under the whole structure.

6. Materialism Unpsychological.

It denies the reality of mind, and attributes thought to mere brain secretion and molecular action. Feuerbach asserts: "Man is what he eats." Says Cabanis: "The brain secrets thought as the liver secrets bile." Carl Vogt: "As contraction is the function of the muscles, and as the kidneys secrete urine, so, and in the same way, does the brain generate thoughts, movements and feelings."

Let us for a moment analyze the second of these statements, for all three mean the same thing. The liver secretes bile. True enough; but the bile secreted by the liver is material substance, just as the liver itself is material substance. Not so with thought, which, while it has its connection with the brain, is not material at all, is not even a thing, an entity, but purely a psychical product and function. Bile and thought are so different in their very nature that they belong to entirely different categories. We cannot think and speak of matter and mind in the same terms. It is a sign of crude and superficial thinking to put them in the same class.

Moreover, if the brain as mere material substance produces mind and thought, then the effect is greater and finer than the cause, and we have another case of something coming from nothing. Here again the maxim, *ex nihilo nihil fit,* must be applied. No; mind and matter are different quiddities; yet they are vitally united in human beings by an all-wise Creator for a clear, definite and exalted purpose. While by an empirical mode of reasoning we cannot explain

the wonderful connection between mind and matter, the philosophy of dualism has the decided advantage that it assigns an adequate cause for all the known effects.

Only a few words are needed in reply to the statement of Cabanis (see above) comparing thought to muscular contraction. It is true that muscular contraction is not an entity, but an abstract term, and in this respect might be like thought; yet how different are the functions of the two! They belong to entirely different categories. For example, muscular contraction is utterly unconscious of itself or its action; but in thought the thinker becomes conscious of himself and of his thinking. Also, muscular action is entirely mechanical and determined by something else; whereas in thought the mind is largely self-determined. How superficial in the reasoning that would identify muscular contraction and the thought-processes of the mind!

The theory of Haeckel, that there is a "mentiferous ether," and that of Edison, that the atoms are endued with mentality, are too far-fetched and strained to merit serious consideration. That myriads of unconscious "infinitesimal minds" (or, as one might say, atomic minds) could ever come together by mere fortuity in the human brain and form a unitary mind that is self-conscious, rational, ethical, volitional and spiritual, is certainly absurd, as well as inconceivable. What a makeshift is this unintelligent "mind-stuff" for a personal Creator and Preserver! All empirical observation goes to prove that wherever there is sufficient mentality to amount to purposive action, there must be personality. A mind that can design anything, even the simplest piece of mechanism, can also say "I," and therefore must be a self-conscious person.[3]

3. See the author's "Contending for the Faith," p. 289. Also De Tunzelman, "God and the Universe," pp. 127ff.

7. Moral Weakness of Materialism.

(1) It virtually destroys the validity of moral distinctions, and affords no true and adequate ground of right; for if there is no moral Person back of and in the universe, what makes one thing right and another wrong? Hence Materialism, if generally accepted, would have a demoralizing effect on individuals and society.

(2) It affords no comfort and hope in sorrow, and therefore leads to *ennui* and pessimism; which also are harmful in their practical effects on the race.

(3) It nullifies all expectation of personal and conscious immortality, and hence affords no ray of hope of the ultimate solution of man's many perplexing problems; no hope that the wrongs of life will ever be made right. Such hopelessness would surely be morally depleting.

(4) In its very nature it is crass and debasing; of the earth, earthy; tending to destroy the higher and nobler aspirations of the soul. As a matter of fact, the materialistic schools do not uphold a high standard of morality, but are disposed to be hedonists in ethics. In a word, for moral uplift and exhilaration Materialism will bear no comparison with Theism.

CHAPTER IX

DEISM

I. EXPLANATION.

1. Definition.

Deism is the view that God created the universe, then forsook it, and relinquished it to the operation of secondary causes and forces.

2. Derivation of the Term.

The word Deism is derived from the Latin *Deus,* God. Its etymology does not give a clue to its peculiar technical meaning in scientific works. See next division.

3. Technical Meaning.

Deism believes in a personal God as the Creator of the universe with all its laws. However, it holds that, after creating the universe, God gave it over to the control of those laws. Hence it denies the divine immanence and providence, and is especially opposed to the doctrine of a special divine revelation, such as we have in the Bible, and contends that the light of nature and reason is sufficient for man's guidance. It advocates the so-called "religion of nature," that is, that a study of nature gives to man all the light he needs to make him a truly religious being.

4. Comparison with Theism.

The word Deism is derived from the Latin word for God, (*Deus*), while Theism is derived from the Greek (*Theos*). So far, therefore, as their etymologies are concerned, Deism and Theism might mean the same thing. However, in scientific and philosophical works these words have come to

have a technical significance. The two views agree in holding that God is a personal Being and that He created the heavens and the earth; they differ in this: Deism rejects the doctrine of the divine immanence and superintendence, while Theism accepts and upholds them.

5. Historical Note.

In its technical sense, Deism arose in England in the closing decades of the seventeenth century, and continued to flourish throughout the eighteenth century. Among its chief proponents were Lord Herbert, Tindal, Shaftsbury, Bolingbroke, Collins, Hobbes, and Thomas Paine. While all Deists believed in God as the Creator and in "the religion of nature," many of them were especially bitter in their hostility to the Bible. Hence they were usually known as "infidels," and sometimes as "freethinkers." In more recent times, however, these terms are applied to all classes of persons who reject the Holy Scriptures as a special divine revelation. Near the close of the eighteenth century Deism had run its course as a movement, and developed into the universal skepticism of Hume and Gibbon, although here and there were practical Deists all along, and there are some today. There is good historical evidence that English Deism was carried into France by Voltaire, and thence by him into Germany during the time of Frederick the Great. In France it became atheistic and materialistic, and in Germany it developed into Rationalism.[1]

II. ERRORS.

1. It is unreasonable to believe that God would create the world, especially one containing sentient and rational

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1. Cf. John Urquhart, "The Inspiration and Accuracy of the Holy Scriptures," pp. 142-144.

beings, and then sever His connection with it. If His creatures should fall into error and trouble, it is rational to believe that He would come to their rescue, and even give to them a special revelation of a way of escape. No true human father would forsake his children as the Deists assert that God has forsaken His creation. It is far more reasonable to believe what we read in the Holy Scriptures: "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father who is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him" (Matt. 7: 11)?

2. Men would soon lose their interest in and respect for a God who had so little solicitude for them as to leave them alone in their struggles and temptations. An absentee God would soon be forgotten.

3. Hence, as a matter of fact, Deism has proved a failure morally and spiritually, for it has done little, if anything, to uplift humanity. It has evinced little power even to keep many of its advocates in the paths of common virtue, as is obvious from an account of their principles and lives.[2]

4. Historically it has always shown a tendency to degenerate into Atheism, Pantheism and Agnosticism. This tendency is perfectly natural, for men cannot long rest in the conception of a merely transcendent Being who shows no interest in their welfare. Hence they are apt to conclude that they would rather believe in no personal God at all than in a God like that of Deism.

5. Philosophically Deism is wrongly based; for the universe, being finite and contingent (as we have already

2. Cf. Horne, "Introduction to the Critical Study of the Holy Scriptures," Vol. I, pp. 22-26.

proved), cannot be independent; cannot in the very nature of the case uphold itself; therefore God, who created it, must continue to sustain it and be immanent in it.

6. Scientifically considered, as well, the cosmos is not an entity that has within itself the power of sustentation. It is made up of finite particles; therefore as a whole it must be finite; its parts are each and all dependent; therefore it must as a whole be dependent. The scientific doctrine of the radiation of energy points to the fact that in and of itself the universe would finally waste away as an orderly cosmos. Therefore it must be continuously dependent upon a Being who is infinite in all His attributes and resources, and who must, therefore, sustain an interested, intelligent and vital relation to it.

Thus Deism as a world-view is not based on scientific, philosophical and rational principles.[3]

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3. An incisive critique on Deism is found in Christlieb, "Modern Doubt and Christian Belief," pp. 190-209.

CHAPTER X

PANTHEISM

I. EXPLANATIONS.

1. Etymology.

Pantheism is derived from the Greek: *pan,* all, and *Theos,* God.

2. Definition.

Pantheism is the philosophy that identifies God and the universe: the universe is God and God is the *universe;* God is the All and the All is God. It especially negates the transcendence and personality of God, and insists on the doctrine that He is immanent only.[1]

3. Classes of Pantheists.

Some so-called Pantheists can scarcely be distinguished from the Materialists, save that they speak of an intangible, indwelling principle or spirit which acts very like an intelligent something. Other Pantheists veer toward Idealism, practically denying that material substance is a real quiddity, but is, rather, an illusion of the mind. The Pantheism of Spinoza, which is perhaps the most conspicuous type, is purely monistic, teaching that there is only *one substance,* which has two attributes, *thought* and *extension,* the former displaying the phenomena of mind, the latter those of matter.

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1. On Pantheism consult the following: Christlieb, "Modern Doubt," etc., pp. 161-190; Micou, "Basic Ideas in Religion," pp. 178-187, and many other references; Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 49-59, 84, 368, 402; Fisher, "The Grounds," etc., pp. 63-67, 138, 398; Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century" (consult index); "Pantheistic Dilemmas," etc., Chap. I.

II. ITS FUNDAMENTAL DEFECTS.

1. It is *too vague and abstruse* to be of practical value as a world-view or philosophy.

Who can get a clear conception of a theory that calls the universe God and God the universe? The universe is not a personal entity. Then how can it be called God? Thus it will be seen that in trying to get a conception of the theory, thought simply vapors off into mistiness.

Then take the idea of the divine immanence on which Pantheism ever insists; how can God be the universe and at the same time immanent in it? If He is immanent, He must be something different from the universe. A thing cannot be immanent in itself, because it *is* itself. Hence Pantheism uses terms without meaning.

Try also to visualize Spinoza's fundamental idea, that of one substance with its two attributes; what a hazy idea presents itself to the mind when you speak of a substance that has two such attributes as thought and extension? How can an attribute like thought give rise to an entity like mind? Is it not clearer and more rational to believe that mind is the basis of thought than the reverse? Can there be an attribute before there is an objective entity? The same argument holds with regard to extension. A substance whose chief attribute is extension surely could not give reality to all the various forms of the material world. A world-view that is so indeterminate is not likely to be true. Compare with it the clearly defined conceptions of Theism.

2. Pantheism *forces matter and mind into one substance.*

It is unscientific thus to manipulate two different quiddities, especially without giving a fundamentally reasoned

basis for such treatment. That matter and mind are different entities may be seen from their phenomena. You cannot convert terms of materiality into terms of mentality. Matter has no consciousness; mind has. Matter is not sentient; mind is. Matter does not think and reason; mind does. Matter is inert; mind is self-moving, self-determining. Matter has no personality, never says "I"; mind has egoity, and says "I". Matter has no conscience, no morality; mind has. Matter has no spiritual consciousness and quality; mind is spiritually active and conscious.

Thus it will be seen that matter and mind belong to different categories. They are marvelously joined and related, but they are different in quality and essence. Hence to force them into one substance, as Pantheism tries to do, is unscientific and irrational. The old aphorism, "What is matter? Never mind; what is mind? No matter," even though meant to be facetious, expresses a fundamental and unalterable truth.

3. Somewhat wedded to the merely phenomenalistic view of the world, Pantheism professedly *denies the category of cause and effect,* and yet is constantly compelled to use terms that mean the same thing. Thus it is fundamentally inconsistent in this respect.

4. It *does not solve the ultimate problem of being* (Ontology), but leaves it as great a mystery as ever. For example, what *is* the ultimate "Substance" of Spinoza, which has the two remarkable attributes of thought and extension? Is it mental stuff or material stuff, or is it merely a "thingless thing"? These are serious questions, and are not meant to be humorous or sarcastic. Thus Pantheism does not solve the ultimate problem of Ontology, and in this respect has no advantage over Theism, while it fails, as

Theism does not, to afford an adequate explanation of the varied phenomena in the material and psychical realms.

5. It assumes that there is thought in the cosmos, intelligence, design; and yet it negates three essential elements of thought, namely, *self-consciousness, feeling and will.* In this respect it proves itself an irrational and insufficient world-view.

6. In trying to explain the evidences of thought in the universe, it reasons from the attributes it finds in the human personality, and yet *denies personality to the ultimate Thinker,* who has at least unfolded the cosmos in an intelligent way. Here again it punctures its own philosophy.

7. It mistakes the very nature of absolute personality by contending that *personality implies limitation.* This is a profound problem, but thorough thinking leads to the conclusion that the only kind of entity that can be infinite is spiritual personality. The spiritual, or, in other words, the psychical, cannot be put into the categories of material substance, which has spatial extension and limitation, and therefore must be finite and dependent; for whatever mind is as an entity or essence, its attribute of thought has no spatial limitation, but can project itself, by means of the imagination, even beyond the boundaries of the physical universe.

Thus we are not irrational in predicating infinity to the Absolute Spiritual Person, who must, by the very exigencies of thought itself, transcend the limits of the finite universe. Therefore, we maintain that the only entity that can be infinite and absolute is mind, which always connotes personality.

The advocates of the idea that personality implies limitation err on account of their confused and inadequate con-

ceptions of the Infinite and Absolute. The same is true of those who believe in the doctrine of a finite God over against the doctrine of an infinite and absolute personal Being as God. The following are their errors:

First, they seem to be able to think only of spatial infinity. It is true, we *can* think of *spatial* infinity, or we could not use the term; but we can gain no clear conception of it, for thought goes on and on for a time, and then must simply stop *per force,* because it can never reach the end. Now we hold that we can also think of *personal infinity,* or we could not use the term. Of course, we cannot obtain a clear and definitive conception of it, either; but we can think just as clearly of personal infinity, and have just as definite an idea of it, as we can of spatial infinity. So nothing is gained by making the Absolute spatially infinite and the Personal finite, while much is lost both for thought and practice.

Second, if the Absolute Being were impersonal or non-personal, it would be limited indeed, because then it would be lacking in the highest attribute of which we have any knowledge. We would have to say "IT," and that is surely a lower conception than to be able to say "HE" of the Ultimate Being. So personality, instead of connoting a limitation, connotes the highest conception.

Third, the advocates of personality as a limitation argue in this way: A person knows himself; but, in order to know himself, he must first know another or others; he must have an *alter ego;* then only can he draw the conclusion that he is a self.

We cannot agree with such reasoning. We can conceive without much mental strain of a Being who is so perfect that He can know himself without having to posit another self as an object. The most fundamental and immanent

intuition of the Absolute Person may be the power of self-consciousness. The idea that the Absolute Being must have an *alter ego* in order to differentiate Himself as Himself is a crude conception, based on thinking in materialistic terms rather than in psychical terms.

It is by no means certain that even finite persons come to know themselves because, first of all, they distinguish others, and then draw the inference that they themselves have selfhood, and thus, by a kind of logical process, arrive at self-consciousness. Surely the little child never passes through a logical mental process like that. Think of a child reasoning in this way: "Here are people and things that are not I; therefore I must be I." Nay, it is far more probable that the power of self-knowing is an inherent intuition of the mind. Perhaps even a finite person might know himself as an ego even if he were the only being in the existence, though it is likely that such knowledge would not be as distinct for a finite being as it is in the midst of other objects from which he can differentiate himself. In the perfect and absolute Being, however, self-consciousness must be an eternal and infinite intuition just as all His other powers and attributes must be eternal and infinite.[2]

8. Here is a serious indictment against the *moral character* of Pantheism; it rejects the well-known fact of human freedom. It lands in pure determinism, and most pantheists not only do not deny this allegation, but argue strenuously against the freedom of the will, maintaining

2. Cf. Snowden's "The Personality of God," pp. 59-65. Besides his own lucid satements, Dr. Snowden quotes pertinently from Lotze and Bowne. Says our author: "Personality is not a limitation, but an additional power." Again: "Personality is the power to know and feel and act, and this ability is not a limitation, but an enormous expansion of power. The absence of such power would itself be a limitation beyond any other conceivable lack" (pp. 60, 61).

that the cosmos has developed simply by inherent principles, and could have developed in no other way. Everything is just as it had to be. Some of the favorite phrases of this system of speculation are, "a predetermined will," "a necessitated will." But such a will is no will at all,[3] but a contradiction of terms, as if one were to speak of "coerced freedom."

Now, a system that negates divine and human freedom destroys morality by that very token. Then how shall we account for the universal fact of morality in the human realm, of conscience, of the sense of freedom? Could pure determinism ever by its own forces produce consciousness of a will in liberty? Here again Pantheism is "weighed in the balance and found wanting."

9. By denying personality to God, Pantheism *eliminates true religion;* for man, being a person, can have real communion only with a personal God. Any other kind of communion than that which is personal is scarcely worthy of the name, and cannot be called religious communion.

10. Although Pantheists may claim a kind of mystical relation to the impersonal All, and therefore may profess a

3. On the freedom of the will, see the following works: Micou, "Basic Ideas in Religion," pp. 332-359; Everett, "Theism and the Christian Faith," Chapters XIX, XX; Gruber, "Creation Ex Nihilo," pp. 97, 98; Pringle-Pattison, pp. 31, 32, 183-187, 287, 288, 291-293, 370-379; Keyser, "A System of General Ethics," pp. 115-128; Snowden, "The Personality of God," pp. 10, 11, 23. The last named author says acutely: "The will is the soul in action, or the soul controlling itself. The stream of ideas and feelings that pour into the consciousness is not an ungovernable flood on which the self drifts helplessly, like a log or a boat without a rudder or engine on a swift current; but the soul has a rudder and an engine by which it can steer and drive its boat to its own destination. . . . We make and choose the motives that move us, and this fact is the very center annd pivot of our free agency and responsibility. The will is thus the spinal column and unifying power of personality, the throne of this kingdom, the crown and captian of the self."

feeling of comfort and inspiration in their system; yet their claim is *nat rationally based*. How can the impersonal universe speak any words of comfort to the soul? It does not *know* the soul's aspirations and sorrows; therefore it cannot minister help and comfort. Men may sometimes derive a kind of fanciful consolation from nature; but this comes only because by an effort of the imagination they put something into nature that is not there.

11. Pantheism *denies* the doctrine of *personal, conscious immortality*. According to this system, the individual is simply re-absorbed into the impersonal and unconscious All. In this doctrine it corresponds with Hinduism, a pantheistic system existing for centuries before modern Pantheism came into vogue. Whatever else may be said of this system, there surely are no comfort and inspiration in the doctrine of re-absorption.

12. In the last place, Pantheism holds that the universe, God, the All, *comes to consciousness only in the personalities called men.*

This is both unscientific and *a priori* absurd, for how could the conscious ever spring from an unconscious source? Here again would be a case of something coming from nothing; of water rising higher than its source. We insist on the fundamental truth: *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* Moreover, a consciousness that is broken up into innumerable fragments, each distinct from the other, would be a poor kind of consciousness, and would be destitute of the unitary principle that is required in a true philosophy of the cosmos, which has written upon it everywhere unity of plan and purpose.

Thus Pantheism will not stand the test of the rational process.

CHAPTER XI

IDEALISM

I. DEFINITION AND DISTINCTIONS

1. Definition.

Idealism is the view that mind is the only entity; hence that the material universe has no real objective existence, but is merely a subjective idea or illusion.[1]

2. Distinctions.

(1) It is the *antithesis of Materialism,* which says the only quiddity is material substance. Some idealists are pantheistic; others are positive in their belief in a personal God.[2] Our reason for including Idealism in the list of Anti-theistic Theories is that we believe true Theism is dualistic and not monistic—that is, it holds that there are two kinds of entities, the material and the physical, or matter and mind, and that they are distinct, though vitally related.

(2) In this work the term Idealism is used in the *philosophical sense* as above defined, namely, that mind is the only reality. The term is often used in what might be called

1. Books to consult: Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 11-41; Micou, *ut supra,* pp. 183-187, and other references in index; Lindsay, "Recent Advances," etc., many references in index; Pringle-Pattison, "The Idea of God," pp. 38-42, 181, 236, 409.

2. One of the best works advocating what might be called Theistic Idealism is Snowden's "The World a Spiritual System." Though not convincing to the present writer, he acknowledges the cogency and beauty of Dr. Snowden's presentation.

the ethical sense; in which sense it refers to high ideals or standards of excellence. The student should bear this distinction in mind.

II. THE ARGUMENTS OF IDEALISM.

1. Things in Themselves Unkown.

This is the chief contention of the idealistic philosophy. It says we cognize only phenomena, not things *per se*. Take, for example, the sense of sight. We say we see a tree. However, we do not directly perceive the substance of the tree, if it has substance, but only the colors and form impinged upon the retina of the eye, which in some mysterious way is borne by the optic nerve back into the cortex of the brain, where it is transferred into the consciousness.

Now, since we perceive only phenomena, we cannot prove by the empirical process that anything but phenomena really exist. The *noumena* which we think must exist may be only a "form of thought" projected by our minds. True, there seems to us to be a real objective tree there, but you cannot *prove* it, because you perceive nothing but the appearance, the phenomenon. Perhaps "things are not what they seem."

In the idealistic system all other senses are treated in the same way. You hear a sound, coming, as you think, from a bell; but really only certain undulations of the air or ether strike your tympanum, and are thence carried by the auditory nerve to the consciousness. In reality you know that only such an impression has been made upon your mind. You do not hear the bell itself. Therefore so far as your consciousness goes, you cannot prove the actual existence of the bell. Even if you were to go near it, and look at it, you would perceive only its form and color. Even if you

were to feel it, your awareness would give you only the phenomena of hardness, coldness, roundness and roughness. The same is true, according to the argument of this system, regarding the sensations of taste and smell. It is the philosophy of pure phenomenalism. Kant and Comte advanced the same arguments, though the former was not an idealist, and the latter was an agnostic.

2. The Fact of Illusions.

The idealistic system makes much of illusions. For instance, the *mirage* is an optical illusion. So far as our awareness goes for the time being, we really think there is a landscape where it appears; but afterward we find that it was only an illusion, an image on the rarified air of the plain or desert. Therefore, says the idealist, may not *all* our seeing be mere illusion? What empirical proof have we that it is not?

Again, we think the sun rises and sets; that the sun, moon and stars swing around the earth, while our own globe is stationary. It is a clear illusion of our entire sensory cognition. Not only does *sight* testify that the earth is standing still, but we also *feel* that it is stationary. Thus these two senses seem to concur in their testimony that the universe is geocentric. And yet the physical facts are contrary to the attestations of experience. It is the earth that moves. So we cannot say that in every case "seeing is believing."

The sense of hearing, too, is often deceptive. Sometimes we think we have heard a sound when there was complete silence, and very often we hear inaccurately.

3. Our Mental Constitution.

Kant argued that the mind may be so constituted as to impose its "own forms of thought" upon external objects.

As we know only phenomena, we cannot be sure what the character of the real objects is, for the phenomena given off by objects must first pass through a mental process which may greatly modify them. So, while Kant did not deny objective reality—he was not an Idealist—his philosophy taught that objects may not be at all what they seem to be in our consciousness. From this position it was not a far step to the conclusion that there may be no objective reality, but only subjective impressions; and therefore *mind* may be the only entity.

These are the arguments of Idealism. We must proceed to examine them.

III. FUNDAMENTAL ERRORS OF IDEALISM.

1. It is *too speculative and obscure,* and is therefore of little practical value.

While we would not advocate mere Pragmatism in philosophy, ethics or religion, yet a system that cannot be understood by the vast majority of people, and that is so obscure as to require a mental strain even on the part of disciplined minds to grasp its main position, is not likely to be the true view of the world.

2. This theory makes the whole *physical cosmos a chimera.*

We are not urging this as a final proof, yet it is hardly reasonable to suppose that so vast a universe of matter would exist only in the imagination; would not be an actual world. It is almost incredible that there should be so much more seeming in the universe than reality.

3. The idealistic theory *contradicts the universal consciousness.*

With the exception of a few speculative philosophers, who live mostly in an academic atmosphere, all people believe in the objective reality of the physical world. In fact, most men never think of questioning its reality. Let a million men look at a tree, and without exception they would all declare that the tree is *there* and that it *exists*. While we are not offering this argument as absolute empirical proof, yet we would ask whether a philosophical system is likely to be true which is so patently opposed to the general experience of mankind. That certainly would make the universe an irrational one, to say the least. Why should the Power back of the universe inflict a general hallucination on the consciousness of mankind? A world-view ought to square with the outstanding facts of human experience.

4. No man, not even the Idealist himself, can *live and conform his conduct to the principles of this system.*

All men have to orient their behavior on the basis of the reality of material things. They cannot treat material objects as if they were non-existent. A man cannot pass through a wall as if it were not there. People do not go right through trees and houses and mountains as if they were only phantasms. If a million people were to pass single file along a path in the center of which there stood a large tree, every one of them would go around it, and treat it as if it were there. Then why should any one adopt a philosophy that cannot be practiced by himself or anyone else?

5. Idealism *confuses illusions with actualities,* and makes the exceptions the rule.

As has been indicated, much of its argument is based on the illusions to which our senses are subject. However, these illusions are the exceptions, and ought not be made the rule. Moreover, let us consider these exceptions. You

will find that there are almost always ways of correcting our mistakes, and tracing back to the realities. There, for example, is the *mirage:* first, it is a reality as a reflection or image on the air in certain meteorological conditions; second, it could not be there as an image if there were not a *real* landscape somewhere that produces it; third, if you will move nearer the *mirage,* it will presently disappear, and thus enable you to correct your error; fourth, when you approach a real landscape, it is found to be there, and is not a mere appearance. Therefore, the argument from the *mirage,* so much used by Idealists, is valueless.

The same is true of the apparent rising and setting of the sun. Science has been able to set men right in regard to the facts; but they have not thereby become convinced that the sun and earth have no actual existence. If the sun and earth were not real, how could men have ever corrected the optical illusion?

The very fact that an Idealist even speaks of an optical *illusion* connotes that he must believe in an optical *reality.*

6. If the objective world *has no reality, how can it produce phenomena?*

Can *nothing* produce an appearance of being *something?* If there is no tree out yonder on the campus, how can there be the epiphany of a tree? This must be a strange, chaotic, irrational world if there can be *phenomena* without *noumena* to produce them.

7. If the material world is not real, why does it *invariably impinge upon man's consciousness as real?*

The most rational explanation of the mutual adaptation of the outer world to the inner human consciousness is that they were purposely made for each other. There is the outer world; corresponding to it is the subjective recep-

tivity; they seem to match each other, to be designed for each other. The eye is a highly specialized organ, marvellously contrived, for the very purpose of seeing the external world and enjoying its beauty and sublimity. So are all the senses organized, each for its own special purpose of correlation with the external world.

8. Let us analyze sense-perception and its content in consciousness *still more deeply,* taking sight for our example.

You think you see a tree there on the campus. The physicist tells you that in reality the image of the tree is formed on the retina of your eye by means of the light-rays; thence is conveyed by the optic nerve to the proper brain center, where, in some mysterious way, it is brought out into the field of consciousness. Now the Idealist declares that no real tree exists, but only an illusory impression on the mind within. Then *why does the tree appear to be out on the campus? It ought to appear within the brain!* According to the Idealist, the mind plays us very strange pranks. If so, what value can you attach to the Idealist's own processes of reasoning?

9. We shall take a simple object, and *subject it to as many tests of sense-perception as possible,* to see what the indubitable conclusion must be.

Here is a red, ripe, mellow apple. First I see it; the sense of sight says it is an apple. Next I feel it, and find it round and smooth and mellow, and the sense of touch declares it is an apple. Then I lift it to my nose, and the sense of smell concurs that it is an apple. Now I thrum upon it with my fingers, and it gives forth a dull, thudding sound, and the sense of hearing agrees that it is an apple. Lastly I eat it, and the sense of taste asserts it is an apple.

Thus all my senses bear the same testimony. Here the five senses positively asseverate and concur that the apple is a reality, not a chimera. If such concurrent testimony is not valid, man has been constituted insane, not rational.

10. Rejecting the plain testimony of consciousness, Idealism *opens the way for the invalidation of all knowledge.* This would make science and philosophy impossible, and render all thought processes nugatory and vain.

11. There is real *moral peril* in the idealistic scheme.

From the negation of the testimony of consciousness in sense-perception, it is only a step to the negation of the testimony of conscience, and the next step is the negation of moral distinctions. In brief, Idealism as a philosophy surrounds everything with an air of unreality, and is therefore dreamy and impractical, and thus tends to disqualify its advocates for true and earnest moral endeavor.

12. In all honesty it must be said that the effect just noted in section 11 does not apply to Dr. James H. Snowden, who has the highest moral and spiritual ideals and is extremely practical. We can simply say that his practice is not logically consistent with his philosophy. He maintains that material substances are merely God's thoughts, which He superimposes on human minds in material forms.

But would not that mean that God deludes His rational creatures by making them think the cosmos made up of real matter, when, after all, it is only the divine thought?

CHAPTER XII

NATURALISTIC EVOLUTION

I. DEFINITIONS.

1. Of Evolution in General.

In general, evolution is the theory that the cosmos has been developed from crude, homogeneous material to its present heterogeneous and advanced status by means of resident forces.[1]

2. Of Theistic Evolution.

Theistic evolution is the view that God created the primordial material, and that evolution has since been His *modus operandi* in developing it to its present status. The author of this work does not believe that the scientific and rational proofs are sufficient to establish the hypothesis of theistic evolution properly so called.

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1. Literature: Fairhurst, "Organic Evolution Considered;" "Theistic Evolution;" Patterson, "The Other Side of Evolution;" Townsend, "The Collapse of Evolution;" Dennert, "At the Deathbed of Darwinism;" Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 96-134; Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 99-101, 128, 176-185, 250, 251, 409-412, 415-418; Micou, "Basic Ideas," etc., pp. 69-99, 409-417, and many other references (consult index); Wright (Geo. F.), "Origin and Antiquity of Man;" Graebner, "Evolution: An Examination and a Criticism" (1921); "Essays on Evolution" (1925); Price (G. M.), "The New Geology" (1923); "The Phantom of Organic Evolution" (1924); "Evolutionary Geology and the New Catastrophism" (1926); Allen, "Evolution in the Balances" (1926); McMullen, "The Logic of Evolution" (1925). Other effective books might be cited.

3. Of Atheistic (Naturalistic) Evolution.

Atheistic evolution is the theory that denies the existence of God, asserts the eternity of matter and force, and attributes the development of the cosmos to purely natural forces.

II. ERRORS OF NATURALISTIC EVOLUTION.

1. All the *arguments urged against Materialism* in a former thesis apply here. A review of them might be profable.

2. Many *noted scientists* have rejected or do reject naturalistic evolution, among them: Aggassiz, Dana, Gray, Lord Kelvin, Virchow, Sir William Dawson, J. W. Dawson, Du Bois Ralmond, Janet, John Fiske, and George Frederick Wright.

3. Mere evolution cannot account for the *origin of matter, force and motion.*

Should the argument be made that you have to assume these things in order to have a cosmos at all, we reply that you must also assume intelligence as necessarily as you must assume matter, force and motion; for the cosmos displays evidences of law, order and design as outstanding facts. Law, order and design connote intelligence, and intelligence demands a Person—therefore God. To endue matter with the intelligence necessary to produce and evolve the cosmos is pure speculation. To attribute the onward and upward movement in the cosmos to mere law, which is only a *modus operandi,* is to speak without reason.

4. Naturalistic evolution cannot account for the *origin of life.*

If, as most scientists today hold, the earth was once a molten or incandescent globe, no life—at least, no life as

we know it today—could have existed upon it. In the blast furnace you see streams of molten ore flowing from immense melting pots. How many living germs would you say the fiery liquid contains? You know there could be none there. So when the earth cooled off, it could have contained no vital germs, cells or nuclei.

There is today no scientific evidence of life arising by mere chemical action or by spontaneous generation. The law of *Biogenesis*—that is, of life only from antecedent life—is the only biological law known to science. Then whence came life? Atheistic evolution has no reply to offer. Theism offers the only adequate solution. If evolution explains everything in the cosmos, there ought to be at least some evidence today of dead matter evolving into living matter by inherent potentialities.

5. Nor can naturalistic evolution give a rational basis for the following outstanding and dominating facts in the present status of the cosmos: *sentiency, consciousness, freedom, morality and spirituality.*

Think of it for a moment. If there is nothing but material substance and blind force in the world, could sentiency have evolved from non-sentient substance? Could the conscious have evolved from the non-conscious, the moral from the non-moral, the free from the necessitated, the spiritual from the non-spiritual, the idea of a personal God from mere material atoms, molecules and electrical forces? Again we insist on the basal truth: *Ex nihilo nihil fit.*

The difficulty with evolution is, it fails at all the *strategic* and *crucial* points, the very places where it is most needed and where it should speak most plainly. Anybody, even a child, can see that an oak grows from an acorn; but we need just one instance showing that mind has evolved from material substance, or protoplasm from dead matter.

6. While there is considerable evidence in the geological ages of progress from lower to higher forms of life, there is also *clear evidence of immense, unbridged gaps among many types,* and there is no definite proof in either the past or the present of the transmutation of one species into another by an evolutionary process. Rather, *persistency of type* seems to be the dominating law.

Think of this for a moment: If evolution were the all-controlling law, the law that is to account for everything in the world, would it not be seen at work today in all its glory and force, developing matter into life, transmuting species into higher forms, and evolving animals into men? Instead of showing its power today, however, it seems to have become inoperative, and we see another law, that of persistency of type, in the saddle. We should like to ask why evolution resigned its position.

7. Again, evolution has left *too many missing links.*

Everywhere there are great, deep and wide gulfs that have not been bridged. If evolution is the oligarch of the cosmos, and if these missing links ever existed, they should be at least fairly abundant in the fossil and other remains of the earth. There are many other such remains. Why do the missing links alone decline to appear? To say that they will doubtless yet be discovered is to admit that evolution is still a very much unproved hypothesis.

Note the gulf between man and the simian tribes. If man was evolved by a slow and gradual process from the monkey or chimpanzee, or from "the same stock" as these animals, there must have been myriads of intermediate creatures once living upon the earth. Why has not one indisputable specimen been found?

Should it be said that calcareous conditions are the only

ones favorable to the preservation of fossils, and that at the time of the advent of the higher animal forms such conditions did not prevail, we reply: But the remains of many kinds of animals of comparatively recent times *have* been found, some of them of immense size. Why then, should not at least a few of the "missing links" appear? The only explanation that seems to be reasonable is that they do not exist and never have existed.

8. Since historic times began, there is *no evidence of progress in nature by its simple, native forces.*

All natural objects simply reproduce their kind, thrive for a while, then perish; and this goes on in a ceaseless round. Only where man touches nature is there progress; and even then, as soon as he removes his guiding hand, the cultured types revert invariably to their original wild and inferior forms. Man is the only being who makes progress, and this he does solely by the force of mind. Yet even the progress of the human family has been anything but steady, as will appear in the next section.

9. Evolution has *not been proved by the history of the human family;* rather, it has been disproved.

Many of the best and noblest representatives of the race appeared too soon for the theory: for example, Abraham, Moses, Christ; among the heathen, Sacrates, Plato, Aristotle, Phidias, Homer, Sophocles, Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and many more. All these should have accommodatingly waited till our present day of progress and civilization, or, better still, till some golden time in the future.

Most of the nations had a high degree of civilization long before historic times began, as is evidenced by their archeological remains. The code of Hammurabi, formulated in the time of Abraham, disproves the theory of evolution.

The law of Moses broke in centuries too soon for the comfort of our theorists. The further back you trace most of the ethnic religions, the purer they become both in principle and form.

On the other hand, the law of degeneration rather than of evolution marks the history of many of the nations. How many great nations have arisen, flourished for a time, and perished! Today, after all the millenniums of so-called evolutionary progress, there are many tribes which are as low in the scale of civilization as any historic primitive people can be proved to have been. That fact gives the theory of evolution a serious, if not fatal, blow. Moreover, the evolutionists have been challenged again and again to cite a single example of a nation that has arisen out of fetichism to monotheism by its own native forces—that is, without help from nations already highly civilized.[2] All these facts tend to discredit the theory of evolution.

10. On *a priori principles* this hypothesis is far from adequate.

After all, evolution is only a law, only a *modus operandi*. Therefore, it is not a power, not an executor. No law can enforce itself. There must be a law-giver and an administrant, or no law could ever have originated, or, if originated, could never have become operative. It is idle to speak of "the reign of law" without positing a law-maker

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2. Principal Fairbairn says: "They assume a theory of development which has not a single historical instance to verify it. Examples are wanted of people who have grown, without foreign influence, from Atheism into Fetichism, and from it through the intermediate stages into Monotheism; and until such examples be given, hypotheses claiming to be 'Natural Histories of Religion' must be judged as hypotheses still" ("Studies in the Philosophy of Religion," p. 12).

and executor. To speak of an impersonal law that can administer and execute itself is an absurdity.

Thus, naturalistic evolution has been proved inadequate and therefore unscientific and unphilosophic. The only view that adequately meets the whole situation is this: *God is the Creator, Preserver and Unfolder of the cosmos.* The term "evolution" is far from sufficient to account for the numerous and diversified phenomena which we may observe in the universe.

CHAPTER XIII

AGNOSTICISM, POSITIVISM, MONISM, PLURALISM

I

AGNOSTICISM

I. DEFINITION.

Agnosticism is the hypothesis that we do not and cannot know whether there is a God or not.[1]

The word is derived from *a,* not, and *gnostikos,* knowing.

II. ERRORS.

1. It is contrary to the *universal beliefs, intuitions and religious instincts of mankind.* If we cannot know whether there is a God or not, why is the belief in God so persistent, dominating and widespread?

2. It is opposed to *Christian experience* wherever it has been honestly and earnestly tried. There are millions of people who will bear unequivocal testimony to the reality of this experience; millions more in history have borne such witness.

3. Agnosticism is *never true to its name*—that is, never truly agnostical: it is always assertive and dogmatic in setting forth its claims, instead of being modest and humble,

1. See excellent discussions in Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 96-134; Orr, *ut supra,* is also profound, pp. 47-51, 80-86, 367, 373; Snowden, "The Personality of God," pp. 2, 55-59.

as its self-chosen name would imply. To be true to its principles and name, it ought not even to assert categorically that it does not know whether there is a God or not, for how can it be sure it does not know, or, at least, that no one can know? Thus it is driven around and around in a circle. Dr. James H. Snowden ("The personality of God," pp. 56, 57) says, with both acumen and wit: "Agnosticism is equally fatal to all knowledge, including knowledge of its own principle. If the human mind is fundamentally an untrustworthy and perversive organ of knowledge, then it cannot truly know anything, not even the fact that it cannot know. Such denial of knowledge must deny its own denial, and thereby cancel itself. Agnosticism literally commits suicide, and then strangely keeps on talking." Also (p. 28): "Men simply cannot, in any legitimate sense, pray to and worship an Unknown Power, or an Infinite Conundrum, or an Eternal Interrogation-point."

4. In its Spencerian form, it is *quite assertive* on this point: it calls the power back of and in the universe the *Inscrutable Power,* and then immediately proceeds to predicate of it many attributes that can belong only to the God of Theism. This procedure is inconsistent with the fundamental position of Agnosticism. If it knows that the Inscrutable Power is possessed of so many personal attributes, how can it call itself by its self-chosen name? And why can it not know just a little more—namely, that the Power that possesses those personal attributes is and must be a Person? Frederic Harrison once said to Herbert Spencer: "You know too much about your Unknowable."

5. It is *narrow and one-sided* in thinking that what cannot be proved by purely logical processes and physical demonstration cannot be proved at all. Many things are known

by direct intuition and experience. Nobody but a misty speculatist tries to prove mathematical axioms by a discursive process, nor the categories of time, space and causality. These are known only by direct intuition. In the end, the only positive and satisfying proof of anything is experience.

6. Agnosticism *gives up the theistic problem too soon.* More penetrating and patient thought and research would lead the thinker to the conclusion, taking all the facts into honest consideration, that the only adequate explanation of the cosmos is that of Theism. Agnosticism is a mark of the collapse of thought.

7. Like the other anti-theistic theories, Agnosticism *affords no comfort, hope and moral inspiration.* "Know-nothingism" is, by its very nature, mentally and morally depleting.

II

POSITIVISM

I. DEFINITIONS.

1. As a Philosophy.

As an attempt at a philosophy, Positivism is the theory that all we can know is *phenomena,* and hence we know nothing of *noumena* — that is, the *essence* of things. It professes to deal only with the things which are *known;* hence its name Positivism. In regard to God, the soul, and the substance of matter, it is agnostical.

2. As a Religion.

As a religion it deifies and worships "Humanity," and has a considerable cultus of forms and ceremonies largely borrowed from the Roman Catholic Church. (The founder

of this system both in philosophy and religion was Auguste Comte.)[2]

II. ERRORS.

1. Philosophical.

It goes too far in *negating all knowledge* of *noumena,* for we do know that they must exist, or there would be no basis for the *phenomena* which we observe. We also feel rationally assured that the *noumena* must correspond with the *phenomena,* or the latter would not be what they are; they might as well be something else. If this is not true, the universal experiences and intuitions of mankind are worthless, and the world is not a rational and consistent system.

Under the theses of Cosmology and Idealism we have already dwelt sufficiently on these points. However, in the interest of thoroughness, these distinctions should be observed: The phenomenalism of Kant held that we do not know what the true character of the *noumena* are, but it did not deny their reality. Idealism denies the reality of the *noumena* of matter, and says they are merely "forms of thought." Positivism simply gives up the whole question, and says we know nothing about the essence of things, and it is vain to try to know.

2. Religious.

As a religion, Positivism is *irrational and valueless,* because "Humanity" is simply a *collective abstraction,* and therefore no real religious communion with it is possible.

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2. Literature: McCosh, "Christianity and Positivism;" Wordsworth, "The One Religion," pp. 307-309; Balfour, "Religion of Humanity;" Sheldon, *ut supra,* pp. 78-95; Lindsay, as above, see index; Muir, "Modern Substitutes for Christianity," pp. 93-123.

Could "Humanity" answer one's prayers? Remember, the "Humanity" of this religion is not the really existent souls of the dead, but only the memory and influence of their deeds as recorded in history. Such *post-mortem* influence has its inspirational value, for "their works do follow them" (Rev. 14:13), and "he, being dead, yet speaketh" (Heb. 11:4); but it is not something which men can consistently worship, or with which they can have personal communion.

The religion of this cult does not naturally grow out of its philosophy, but is a mechanical attachment. The religion was an afterthought with Comte, who realized that human nature craves and needs religion.

III

MONISM

I. DEFINITION.

Monism is the theory that there is only one substance. The word is derived from *monos,* one.

II. EXPLANATIONS.

1. The Several Classes.

(1) Materialism is monistic; it asserts that the *only entity is material substance.*[3]

(2) Idealism is monistic, asserting that *mind is the only entity.*[4]

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3. Ernest Haeckel, of Germany, was a materialistic Monist. Joseph C. McCabe, of England, and John H. Leuba, of America, are monists of the materialistic and mechanistic school.

4. Berkeley was an idealistic monist; so is Professor James H. Snowden.

(3) Spinoza's Pantheism was monistic, for he reduced everything to *one substance,* to which he assigned the attributes of thought and extension.

2. The Antithesis of Monism.

Its opposite is *Dualism,* which is the theistic conception; that is, it believes in the reality of two substances, mind and matter, which, while never confused or consubstantiated, are nevertheless vitally connected in the unitary plan of the cosmos.

Dualism holds firmly to the distinction between God and the cosmos, and believes in the reality of both. While it holds that they are distinct, and are never identified as in Pantheism, it maintains that God is not only transcendent, but also immanent.

Let us now state precisely the view of Natural Theism as developed in this work: Before the creation of the universe there was monism, for God was the only being, the only entity. Since the creation of the universe there is dualism, for God created material substance *ex nihilo,* and gave it real being, but never mingled it with His own essence. He also created mental substance in making the human mind, but this substance is *similar* to His own essence; that is, it is psychical, not material, substance; but it is not the *same* essence as the divine. As the Greeks put it, God's essence and man's mind or soul are *homoiousios,* not *homoöusios*—similar, but not the same.

III. ERROR OF MONISM.

It is not necessary to expatiate on this thesis. We have already shown that it cannot be maintained in any of its forms—Materialism, Idealism, or Pantheism. Its fundamental error is that it attempts the rationally impossible—

the reduction of two such different entities as matter and mind into one substance. Matter may be thought of, and is organically related to mind in man's being, but it can never be converted into mind; nor can mind ever be reduced to material substance.

The great argument for Theism is that, by positing the Divine Mind first as the eternal and self-existent essence, we assign an adequate cause for the cosmos itself and all cosmical phenomena and processes. It is much more rational to believe that mind produced matter than that matter brought forth mind. The cause must always be greater than the effect. To our way of thinking, this is not only the *most* rational explanation of the universe, but the *only* rational one.

IV

PLURALISM

I. DEFINITION.

Pluralism is "the doctrine that there are more than one or two kinds of being or independent centers of causation in the universe; — opposed to *monism* and to *dualism*" (Webster).

II. VARIOUS FORMS OF PLURALISM.

1. Pluralism of Primary Elements.

This view maintains that matter is composed of a number of discrete elements, like oxygen, hydrogen, radium, etc., which scientists have not been able to reduce to one unitary element. Some of the Greek philosophers thought that water was the fundamental element; others that it was fire; others air. Empedocles contended that there were four ultimate elements, earth, air, fire and water; Aristotle added a fifth, namely, ether. But these elements have been ana-

lyzed and separated as research has gone on, so that today scientists find that there are over eighty irreducible atomic or electronic elements. Materialists would hold that these are discrete and eternal parts, without any fundamental unifying substance. Hence Pluralism of this variety.

2. Pluralism of Eternal Finite Selves.

This is the theory that each finite self, or person, or ego is underived and eternal, not created by the absolute God. It has lately been advocated by Professor G. H. Howison and others, who hold that "the acts of the self-conscious individual are *his own* acts, not to be fathered on any 'nature of things,' and that every self-conscious being is in this sense a free and originative source of activity." "No being that arises out of efficient causation can possibly be free," avers Professor Howison. "Not even divine agency can give rise to another self-active intelligence by any *productive* act." Therefore the universe is "an eternal Pluralism," "a society of minds," "a circle of self-thinking spirits," in which God is indeed "the central number," but "only as *primus inter pares*."[5] Hence this view holds to the doctrine of a finite God, and rejects the idea of an infinite and absolute Being as Creator and Preserver.

3. Pluralism of Strung-along Phenomena.

Our designation of this theory may be open to criticism, but we can think of no better phrasing. It is the hypothesis advocated by William James in his two works, "A Pluralistic Universe" and "Pragmatism." Somewhat closely related to Prof. Howison's view, it does not teach clearly the doctrine of many eternal and uncreated selves. According to this view, the universe is not really an *uni-verso,* not

5. Some of the quotations in this paragraph are from Pringle-Pattison's "The Idea of God," pp. 316, 386.

a true solidarity, but only "a strung-along unfinished world in time," an aggrgeate of things, "a collocation of independent facts," a continuing series connected by "and."[6]

Here again we meet with the doctrine of a finite God. James makes a sharp distinction between God and the Absolute. The Absolute is "the whole of things," of which God is a part—"one of the eaches," as Mr. James puts it in his characteristic phrase. He is *in* the universe, not *transcendent* to it. He is "finite either in power or knowledge, or in both at once," "having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves." Hence God is one of us, only much greater; not different in kind, only in degree; our helper in the struggle to make the world better. Hence He is not *unus et unicus,* but only *primus inter pares.* He might be called man's Senior Partner in the shaping of "the world's great fate." Says Pringle-Pattison of James: "The course of the world appears to him as a struggle in which the forces of reason and goodness are at grips with Chaos and Old Night."[7]

Professor James maintains the theory of a finite God because of the evil and suffering which he sees in the world, which he thinks an absolute and infinitely good and powerful Being would not have permitted. If God is finite, He could not have prevented the evil and cannot now eliminate it. This, James thinks, exonerates God from responsibility for evil, and makes Him man's chief helper in the melioristic plan and purpose gradually to overcome all sin and suffering.

We must examine and analye this theory, which seems to be so fascinating to many people of our day.

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6. Pringle-Pattison, *ibid,* pp. 303-399.
7. *Ibid,* p. 394.

III. ERRORS OF PLURALISM.

1. It is Self-Contradictory.

To speak of a "pluralistic universe" is a contradiction of terms. If plurality were its only or chief characteristic, it would not be a *universe,* which means *turned into one* (*unus* and *verto*). We note, too, that pluralists of all sorts are constantly treating the cosmos as if it were held together in some kind of a bond of unity; as if it has a predilection for "togetherness." Therefore basically the cosmos must be a unity, not a plurality. There must be something that holds it parts together in a cosmos, or it would be a chaos.

2. The First View Materialistic.

We have already dealt with Materialism as an impossible world-view. Here we need only to add that, in spite of the fact that science finds something over eighty primary and as yet irreducible elements, it still is true, being proven by empirical test and observation, that these various discrete units (called atoms, ions or electrons) are held together in the solidarity of the whole system. If there were no unifying principle or power, the elements would fly into chaos. Perhaps from the material viewpoint the universal ether is the stuff that unifies and holds together all the diverse elements. Going back still further, it is reasonable to believe that the Divine Mind, being one Ego, conserves in a beautiful and effective unity all the endless diversity of the cosmos. In the human world mind is able to bring together into a system many disparate parts. Why cannot the Infinite Mind do the same for the universe?

3. The Second View Impossible.

On the face of it, there could not be innumerable finite selves, uncreated, underived and eternal. We know that

our finite selves have come into existence in time; they have not existed from eternity; for nearly all persons can give their ages to the year, month and day, some of them to the hour. There is not a shadow of scientific and empirical proof that we have existed in any form whatever from eternity. Neither memory nor intuition tells us so. The theory is pure gratuitous speculation.

To our mind, there is no difficulty in believing—in spite of Professor Howison's contention—that the Infinite God, who is Himself the union of the ethically free and the ethically necessary, could have created finite beings with such a degree of freedom as He Himself would determine; nor is it inconsistent to believe that such a Being would respect the freedom of the moral agents He had constituted. This view would impose no limitation on God, for it is an attribute of His perfect and unchangeable character and purpose to grant such liberty to His finite creatures and to deal with them as moral agents. If He could not do that, He would be limited indeed. While in Himself He possesses omnipotence, that does not mean that He must always and everywhere *use all* His power. No human being does.

Again, it is unreasonable to believe that human selves could be infinite in one way—that of eternity—and finite in other ways. To be finite at all means to be finite in every way. Nor is it conceivable that there should be more than one eternal Being, as there can be only one Infinite, only one Absolute.

Moreover, Professor Howison is inconsistent in holding to the pluralistic world-view, for he himself admits of the inner harmony of the innumerable finite selves. What is the principle of confederation that holds them together? Whatever or whoever it is, it must be the *fundamental* power or entity.

The revulsion of Pluralists against an absolute monarchical God is not well taken, for Theism does not represent Him as an eternal despot and egoist, or as an "idle dreamer" before the creation, or as a mere spectator of the show going on in the world, but as a God of eternal activity and of infinite love and compassion, coupled with omnipotence, omniscience and justice. A Being that did not have these attributes would not be absolute; neither would He be absolute if He did not have personality, for then He would be lacking in the highest quality and power of which the human mind can have any conception.

4. The Third View also Untenable.

Professor James held strongly to the doctrine of the Absolute, in which all things (including God) have their source and being. Then the Absolute must be the basis of the universe, and must hold it together in a congruous system. Therefore the unifying principle, not the principle of diversity, must be *basic;* thus Pluralism undermines its own foundation. An endless succession of "ands" would surely never constitute a unified, consistent and coherent system.

The doctrine of a finite, growing and struggling God[8] gives men a feeling that, after all, the right and the good may not finally be victorious; for if "Chaos and Old Night" (that is, the forces of evil) are inherent in the Whole or the Absolute, they must be eternal, and therefore may be more powerful than God, in which case God and His human "helpers" may finally be defeated; or the evil forces may be evenly matched with God, and then the awful conflict will go on forever and ever. That view cuts the nerve

8. The doctrine of a finite, struggling God also finds an advocate in Mr. H. G. Wells; see his "God the Invisible King."

of all moral effort.[9] On the other hand, the doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise God gives assurance of ultimate victory over all malign forces "in His own good time."

Apropos to this point we quote from Dr. Henry C. Sheldon's recent work, "Pantheistic Dilemmas and Other Essays" (pp. 116, 117): "A finite entity, which is not supported by a true infinite, may conceivably reach a culmination, and thereafter follow the path of deterioration. So practically runs the story of a mythological deity in more than one instance. . . . A God who is worthy of the name must be regarded as fundamental to the entire world order. If He may be supposed to work in an inconstant and self-contradictory manner, the foundations of intellectual confidence are disrupted. One whose God is in process of making might possibly be brave enough to hope for a good outcome to the system of things; but in a rational point of view he walks on insecure ground."

How much better, therefore, from the practical viewpoint it is to believe in an infinite and immutable God as the Creator and Upholder of the universe!

As to why God, though infinite, permitted evil and does not at once and summarily destroy it, that subject has been dealt with by profound thinkers from Job and Plato to the present time. Nearly every great philosopher and theologian has attempted a theodicy with more or less success. In other parts of this volume such an effort has also been made.[10] The best answer that can be given is that the high-

9. The idea of two eternal warring principles or spirits (known as Dualism), the good and the evil, is far from new: it appears in Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, Manichæism, and Plato. Many a "modern" theory is, after all, only a recrudescence of old views.

10. See Chapters VI and XV. A recent and eminently successful attempt at a theodicy in view of the world-war is Forsyth's "The Justification of God." Even Milton long ago, in his "Paradise Lost," declared that his purpose in that work was "to justify the ways of God to men."

est values are moral and spiritual values; that they are of far greater significance than is mere happiness; the only way, so far as we can see, to realize such values was to make a moral universe inhabited by free and rational beings. This meant test and trial, and the very conception of freedom connotes the possibility of wrong choice. God might have created men to be only happy automata, but He evidently did not see fit to do so, but made them free moral agents. As Dr. Pringle-Pattison aptly points out, the whole viewpoint of the pluralists is hedonistic,[11] with a strange lack of appreciation of the superlative worth of pure moral excellence. Is not a free agent, even though he must pass through struggle and trial, of vastly higher rank than a mere happy jumping-jack?

The term, "A Pluralistic Universe," is a self-contradiction, if it means that the fundamental principle of the universe is diversity, made up of discrete parts and entities. You cannot build a universe on a string of "ands" any more than you can build a house on a pile of sand. The very word universe connotes as the fundamental conception that of unity, of "togetherness" in a real bond.

And now what is the true, all-sided view? It must be this—unity in the midst of diversity; a fundamental unity holding together in a purposeful plan the endless diversity, and also capable of expressing itself in such diversity. What is the only entity, so far as we can judge, that possesses such a unifying capacity? We answer confidently, *a personal God who is a Mind, with a central, unifying Ego,* binding together all the diversified elements of His own life, and expressing Himself in marvellous diversity in the universe, and holding it together in the unity of a wise and

11. "The Idea of God," pp. 403-407.

beneficent purpose. Personality, we repeat, is the only unifying principle and power of which we have any knowledge. Mind is a constitutive unit in its egoity, with marvellous diversity in its faculties or functioning powers. God is the Ultimate Mind. Therefore the theistic world-view is the only one that is adequate and truly rational.

5. The Defects of Pragmatism.

The theory of Pragmatism has been mentioned in the course of our discussion. It does not need a separate section, but may be treated briefly under a minor head. In recent times William James has been its most conspicuous champion, having written an entire volume on the subject.[12]

Pragmatism is the theory that *usefulness is the fundamental value.* It is a system of utility. Truth is not the ultimate or the highest value or conception; for, no matter whether a principle is basically true or not, if it is beneficial, it is all right by that very token for the time being. Pragmatism deals with ethics, theology and philosophy. In ethics it leads to mere utilitarianism without any real basis for moral distinctions, any foundation for right and wrong in reality. In theology it has its equivalent in the hypothesis of "value judgments" held by Albrecht Ritschl and his school, teaching that Christianity, even if it were not historically true, has the value of truth if it is beneficial to humanity. In philosophy it holds that truth is not static, but is in a constant flux, according as things are useful or harmful.

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12. See his book entitled "Pragmatism." Dr. H. C. Sheldon deals most effectively with this cult in his recent work, "Pantheistic Dilemmas and Other Essays," devoting the whole of Chapter II to its discussion. In the same chapter he handles Pluralism and the idea of a limited God. He also devotes a chapter to Henri Bergson (III), and another to "The Notion of a Changing God" (IV).

In at least three respects this theory is erroneous. First, it is one-sided in laying the whole emphasis on one item, namely, utility. In a world of endless diversity like ours a true philosophy cannot be built up on only one fact or phenomenon. All the true facts must be taken into account. The human mind craves and demands truth as well as utility; moral good as well as happiness; unity as well as diversity; statics as well as dynamics; stability as well as mutation and movement.

Second, in practice it tends to defeat its own ends. The human mind is so constituted as to demand that the useful be based on the true. The moment men suspect the truth of a view or a proposition, they will, if they are sincere and thoughtful, lose confidence in its utility, and will regard it is pernicious. Either that, or they will arise in their ethical virility and will say: "We want no factitious good derived from delusion and falsehood; we want the *truth,* come joy or sorrow!" An acute recent writer, in speaking of the Christian system (his reasoning would apply to any other system), says: "Most persons would say without hesitation that, if it is false, it is worthless, and probably detrimental, but if it is true, it has some value, and may be of priceless value." Also: "Our judgment of its worth hinges on our judgment as to its truth or falsity."[13]

Third, a view that is not utterly scrupulous about truth is not based on the right ethical principles. Fundamental ethics is profoundly concerned for the truth, because error of any kind is immoral, and lack of earnestness about it is decidedly so. It is truly said, "Beauty is its own excuse for being." The same motto is just as applicable to truth, which exists in its own inherent and basic right.

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13. Dr. David S. Kennedy, editor, in *The Presbyterian* for June 9, 1921.

No! a complete, all-round philosophy does not place truth and utility in opposition, but finds them to be in beautiful accord, and assigns to each of them its proper place.

We think this is as far as reason can go in its pursuit of the theistic argument. It may not prove convincing to the intellect of every thinker, for reason cannot always say the final word. In reply to any proposition that cannot be mathematically demonstrated, one may say: "Yes, that seems to be reasonable; and yet I wish I knew for a certainty that it is true." In such a case conscience constrains us to add that final and absolute certitude can be gained only by *a veritable experience of God's power and grace in the soul.*

PART IV

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AND RELATIONS

CHAPTER XIV

THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES

I. DEFINITION.

A divine attribute is *a quality or perfection that belongs inherently to the being of God.* It is not an entity or quiddity, but a characteristic or condition of being, as we say virtue is an attribute of man.

II. RATIONALE.

There are two ways by which Natural Theism determines the divine attributes:

First, from *their manifestations* in the cosmos, including nature and man; second, from the processes of *reason.* However, in treating the subject these two methods are combined.

In Christian Theism the divine attributes can be more fully treated, because that branch of scientific theology works in the light of God's special revelation of Himself to man. For example, the love of God is most clearly and impressively displayed in the plan of redemption, but mere human reason, without revelation, can say little or nothing relative to that topic. What do nature and reason tell us about God's perfections?

III. CLASSES OF ATTRIBUTES.

1. Self-existence.

By this attribute is meant that God has the ground and basis of His being in Himself alone.

While this may be a difficult conception to some minds, yet reason teaches that the ultimate Being must be possessed inherently of this quality. As has been shown in former theses, something exists now—a self-evident proposition; therefore something must have always existed; for if there ever had been a time when there was nothing, nothing could have ever been.

Now, it is obvious that what has always existed could not have been produced by something else and could not be dependent for its existence on something other than itself; therefore, the source and ground of its being must be within itself. However, we have already shown by all the theistic arguments that the only adequate cause of the universe is a personal Being whom we call God. Thus, reason demands self-existence as a necessary divine attribute.

2. Eternity.

By this attribute we mean that God has always been and always will be.

The rational basis for this attribute is the same as that which proves self-existence. There must have always been something, or nothing could have ever come into being. But the cosmos demands a personal Being as its Primal Cause; therefore, God must be an eternal Being.

3. Personality.

(1) *Definition.*

By personality we mean that God is a Being who can say "I." He is the eternal and absolute Ego who knows, thinks

and wills. He is the eternally self-conscious Being. He is the eternal Self.

(2) *Argumentation.*

The Teleological Argument proves God to be Personal, because the design which is so palpable in the universe in its entirety and in all its parts connotes a Designer who is intelligent and free; but such a Being must be a person.

The Cosmological Argument verifies God's personality, for there are persons in the cosmos, namely, human beings, and the only adequate ground for such personalities is a Person who brought them into existence; the non-personal never could have evolved into the personal.

The Moral and Esthetical Arguments postulate a personal God, for morality can be predicated only of persons and the beautiful can be truly appreciated only by persons.

The Ontological Argument leads to the same conclusion; for the perfect and absolute Being could not be perfect and absolute without personality, since personality is one of the highest attributes conceivable.

Speculative philosophers like Hegel, Fichte, Schelling and Von Hartmann, who talk about "Unconscious Will," are using contradictory terms. If God is intelligent and free, He must be a Person.

(3) *Is God superpersonal?*

At this point we must, in the interest of thoroughness, notice the view, set forth by a certain class of speculatists, that God is *not personal,* but *superpersonal.* Herbert Spencer seemed to hold this opinion, or something akin to it, for he says: It is an "erroneous assumption that the choice is between personality and something lower than personality, whereas the choice is rather between personality and something higher."[1]

1. "First Principles," page 109.

One cannot help wondering what kind of a being that would be which was "something higher" than a self-conscious, rational, free and moral personality. If there is such a being, we evidently can have no conception of it. Certainly the "Inscrutable Power," which Mr. Spencer wishes to substitute for a personal God as the ultimate ground and cause of the universe, is not "something higher" than a person, but, rather, something lower; for Mr. Spencer studiously avoids attributing self-consciousness to it. We leave it to common sense: Which is the higher kind of being, one that has, or one that has not, the attribute of self-consciousness, the ability to say "I"?

An advocate of the view that God is superpersonal was Dr. Paul Carus, who said of God:

"He is not personal, but superpersonal. He is not a great man, he is God. He is the life of our life; he is the power that sustains the universe; he is the law that permeates all; he is the curse of sin and the blessing of righteousness; he is the unity of being; he is love; he is the possibility of science and the truth of knowledge; he is light; he is the reality of existence in which we live and move and have our being; he is life and the condition of life, morality. To comprehend all in a word, he is the authority of conduct."[2]

Such statements, given without argument or proof, need little refutation. What is there about them to prove that God is *superpersonal*? They are just as true if we conceive of God as a personal being; indeed, they comport much better with that idea. "He is the curse of sin and the blessing of righteousness." How can He be that without being a self-conscious and rational being? "He is

2. "The Dawn of a New Religious Era" (1916), page 25.

love." Can a being love without self-conscious personality? "He is the authority of conduct." How can there be moral authority worthy of the name without rational personality? Either this author's statements connote personality in God, which is a clear conception, or else they are a lot of abstractions of which no human mind can form a definite idea. Dr. Pringle-Pattison rightly says:

"We call God personal because in personality is revealed the highest we know, and it is better, therefore, as Mr. Bradley says, to affirm personality than to call the Absolute impersonal."

If any one has so curiously constructed a mind as to be determined to think that there is something greater and higher than personality, he will still be compelled to admit that God must at least be personal, even though He may be something more. But that is using words without knowledge, without lucidity of thought. Besides, we very much fear that those who hold the view that God is supra-personal do so because they want to deny personality to Him. According to that conception, supra-personality would be something less than personality, which is a contradiction of terms and an absurdity in thought. Says Dr. Snowden: "In our human world all things are interpreted in terms of and derive their worth from personality." Therefore, if God has any worth that will appeal to the human mind, He must be personal.[3]

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3. For additional argumentation consult the following works: Mullins, "Why is Christianity True?" pp. 340, 403; Snowden, "The Personality of God" (one of the fullest discussions with which we are acquainted); Bowne, "Personalism;" Fisher, "The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief," Chap. I; Harris, "The Philosophic Basis of Theism," Chapters VI-XVIII.

4. Spirituality.

This means that God's essence is *spirit or mind, not matter.* We have already vindicated the doctrine of Dualism. There are two kinds of "stuff" in existence: mind and matter. They belong to different categories, and therefore cannot be merged into one substance, as is done by the monistic systems. Matter is subject to purely mechanical laws, and is inert and unfree. Mind has very different qualities; it is self-conscious, self-determining, moral and spiritual. Therefore, Dualism is the only adequate philosophy.

But mind is greater than matter; a quiddity of a nobler quality; therefore, matter never could have produced or evolved mind. The only rational and adequate hypothesis is that mind was first. Therefore, the ultimate Cause of the universe was the eternal, self-existent, personal Mind.

5. Unity.

By this attribute we mean that God is *one God and the only one of His kind.* In scholastic phrase, He is *unus et unicus*—that is, one and unique. He is *sui generis,* in a genus of His own, in a class by Himself.

The oneness of God is proved rationally in several ways. The universe (*unus,* one, and *verto,* to turn) displays such wonderful unity of plan and operation that the only rational conclusion is that it is the product of one omniscient Mind. It would be idle to suppose that it was produced by two or more minds when its solidarity of plan is better explained on the principle of unity.

Again, God is infinite; there can be only one Infinite. God is absolute; there can be only one Absolute. God is independent; there can be only one Independent Being. God is self-existent; there can be only one such a Being.

6. Infinity.

(1) *Definition.*

By infinity is meant that God is *without boundary or limitation of any kind.* Some thinkers add the qualifying phrase: "except those that belong to the perfection of His own character." By this modification they mean, for example, that God cannot do wrong, for, if He could, it would mean that He is not a perfect Being.

However, difficult as the conception may be, the author is disposed to think that God is not limited in the way indicated; it would not be correct to say, "God *cannot* do wrong." We would rather put it thus: God is so perfect and absolute in His moral character that He *will* not do wrong. We would not even put a limit on the moral freedom of God. However, in so difficult a matter of metaphysics there is room for honest difference of opinion.

The caviler sometimes says that God is not infinite in power, because He cannot perform absurdities like these: "turn a grindstone two ways at once;" or, "place two hills side by side without a valley between them." We have no right to say dogmatically what God *cannot* do even in the absurd cases just cited; rather, we should say that, if God should perpetrate an absurdity, one in entire contradiction to the laws that He Himself has imposed on the material universe, that would mean that He is indeed a limited Being. His infinite perfection is a guarantee that He will always do the right and rational thing, never anything puerile or absurd.

As to the conception of spatial infinity, no one can understand it. In reality we cannot conceive of infinite space, and yet we cannot conceive of a line or point where space stops. Our minds are so formed that we always think in

the categories of time and space, and cannot think otherwise. So we cannot in our present state of knowledge formulate a definite idea of infinity and eternity, and should be honest enough to admit our ignorance and inability.

However, this is no reason for rejecting our necessary idea of the reality of these things, for, though we know there are time and space, no one can define them. What is time? What is space? These are still two of the unsolved problems of speculative philosophy. All we can say is that the ideas of time and space are necessary ideas, and so are the ideas of eternity and infinity.

(2) *Infinite Divine Attributes.*

a. *Omniscience.*

God is all-wise. For the argument, see Chapter IV, Section 5 (3).

b. *Omnipotence.*

God is all-powerful. For the argument, see Chapter IV, Section 5 (2).

c. *Omnipresence.*

God is personally everywhere present. If He were not present everywhere, something would occur in some part of His universe that would throw it out of accord and balance, and that would precipitate universal wreckage, and would perhaps involve God's own ruin. The personal presence of God in every place and in all places is beyond human comprehension, and yet reason requires this view of His personal ubiquity for the preservation of Himself and His universe.

7. Justice.

This attribute signifies that God loves righteousness and will reward it, and that He hates sin and will punish it.

The Moral Argument would connote this fact, for if God is a moral Being, the attribute of perfect justice must pertain to Him.

8. Goodness.

This means that God is loving, beneficent, kind, desiring the highest well-being of all His creatures.

Skeptical and pessimistic philosophers have so often called the goodness of God in question, and have argued the subject so elaborately, that, in order to treat it with any degree of adequacy, we must devote an entire chapter to its presentation. The time given to it will not be spent in vain, for the mentally and morally depleting influence of pessimism is evident on every hand today.

CHAPTER XV

THESIS ON GOD'S GOODNESS

I. WHY A SPECIAL THESIS.

The goodness of God has been so frequently assailed by agnostics, atheists and pessimists that the Theist today must meet the difficulties frankly and vindicate the divine character with sound argument.[1] Mere abuse will not answer the objections of the skeptic or satisfy the honest doubts of the inquirer. An unbiased investigation of the cosmos as it actually is will reveal the fact that there are real difficulties.

II. DIFFICULTIES FRANKLY STATED.

1. *Organisms are often imperfect;* many of them are apparently of a low order and crudely contrived; they are frequently deficient in strength, even for the purpose for which they were intended; and all of them are liable to derangement, and will finally wear out and cease to function. Even the eye, admirable a piece of mechanism as it is, has often been criticized by eminent anatomists for its apparent imperfections.

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1. Valentine's "Natural Theology," (pp. 231-251) is especially fair and judicial on this topic, and the author is glad to acknowledge his indebtedness to that work. Consult also Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 186-199. A vindication of God's goodness and justice is called a *theodicy* (from the Greek, *Theos,* God, and, *dike,* right, justice).

2. Organisms seldom, if ever, seem to be perfectly adapted to their environments. On account of their imperfect functioning, they bring on many distressing diseases, especially in the human body. Animal organisms are not so susceptible to disease; yet even they may become ineffective and painful through accident. Thus nature sometimes appears to defeat her own purposes.

3. The earth in many ways does *not seem to us to be the best possible:* there are large zones of torrid heat and frigid cold, where life is very difficult and in some cases impossible. There are also large areas of sterility, as the desert of Sahara, and many dank, noisome, miasmatic swamps.

4. A serious difficulty is the *large amount of animal suffering* in the world, due to the constitution of nature herself. The carnivorous species seem to be designed by nature for catching, holding, slaying and devouring their victims. Note the talons and beaks of the owls, hawks and eagles, and the claws of all the felines. These instruments are just as highly specialized for their purpose as the eye is for sight and the ear for sound.[2]

5. There is much *unavoidable human suffering* in the world. The innocent often suffer with the guilty, as in the case of storm, flood and war. The same is true of the many diseases to which human beings are subject. Sooner or later, too, death overtakes all men.

On account of these difficulties many persons, looking only on the surface of things and making mere pleasure

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2. J. S. Mills, in his "Three Essays," makes a terrific indictment of nature on the score of her apparent cruelty. Naville, in "De Maistre," is only a little less severe. Tennyson, "In Memoriam," gives us the gory phrase, "nature red in tooth and claw."

the *summum bonum* of life, have turned atheistic. The theist as well as the atheist is cognizant of these difficulties, and has often been puzzled by them.[3] While it is no mark of depth of thought to recognize them, for even the child is often troubled by their presence and prevalence, yet we must deal with them frankly, and must not close our eyes to the facts. So we turn to the positive side of the problem.

III. MITIGATING EXPLANATIONS.

1. *We can explain nothing fully* — time, space, cause, effect, matter, mind; therefore our inability here is no exception to the rule.

2. If we could explain these difficulties perfectly, *we could do the same with all our other problems;* then where would there be any room for faith? Yet how many things must be taken on faith in this world! In how many ways we must trust nature and our fellowmen! All this proves that the present regimen is evidently intended to develop and discipline our faith.

3. Another fact is that *sin has come into the world.* This is not a matter of speculation. Whether we are Christians or not, we must admit the presence and fact of sin,

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3. As has been seen in previous chapters, it is the presence of sin and suffering in the world that has given rise to the doctrines of Pluralism and Meliorism and the theory of a finite God, as advocated by Hume, J. S. Mill, G. H. Howison, William James and H. G. Wells. Recently the author has been reading a good deal of infidel literature. He finds that most of the infidelity of this country and Great Britain today is atheistic, not deistic, as it was in former days, the days of Bolingbroke, Newport, Tindal, etc., down to the time of Thomas Paine. In nearly all cases, infidels deny the divine existence on account of the calamities seen in nature and the unhappiness that comes to human life. It appears that the only kind of a world that would satisfy them is a world of unalloyed pleasure. They have little conception of pure moral excellence.

for our consciences attest it. This fact will help to account for the disarranged natural order for the present age or dispensation, and also why the intellect of man has become obscured.

4. There *may be divine goodness and wisdom even where they are not perfectly plain to our beclouded faculties.* God may simply be moving "in a mysterious way His wonders to perform."

5. *We are finite and the world is subject to finity.* So far as we can see in the present order, however it may be by and by, finiteness implies imperfection.

6. Being the creatures of *time and very greatly limited in our powers, we may see only a part of God's eternal plan.* Perhaps when we come to see His whole order and purpose, we shall acclaim His infinite beneficence. Is it not better and braver to think in this hopeful way than to abandon ourselves to despondency and cynicism?

7. The vast majority of nature's contrivances and adaptations *are beneficial.* If this were not so, the fittest could not survive, and, indeed, the whole world would speed to ruin. There is a balance on the side of wisdom, kindliness and order, or the world could not continue. A majority on the side of chaos would have wrought havoc long ere this.

8. *Animal tragedies* may be explained by the following alleviating circumstances:

(1) There is *more pleasure than pain* in the sentient realm. Any one who is a student of nature is impressed with the general air of joy that nature and all her creatures wear. As a rule, nature is less cruel than man. With possibly an exception or two, there is no evidence that animals

torture each other. That sort of wantonness and vindictiveness seems to be left to man. Even the cat playing with the mouse perhaps does not intend to torture its victim, but simply to gratify its playful disposition.

(2) Death *makes room for more animals,* and thus the sum total of sentient happiness is increased; for, if all survived, the world would soon be over-crowded, and perhaps all alike would perish.

(3) *Speedy death is the general order* in the animal world, and that is the *most merciful* regimen that could have been devised, provided death could not be entirely avoided. Suppose that a slow and lingering death were the usual order in the animal creation, how much greater would be the amount of suffering!

(4) Perhaps many animals are *not extremely sensitive to pain.* At least, such is the belief of many of the most eminent naturalists.[4] Wounded animals soon fall into a kind of stupor, or comatose state, as if nature herself provided an anesthetic for her sentient children. Nor do animals have clear ideas of death, such as men entertain; and they certainly are not troubled with any fear of what may come after death.

Alfred R. Wallace, the contemporary of Darwin, criticized the latter's theory of a perpetual struggle in nature. "Where we err," he says, "is in giving to animals feelings and emotions which they do not possess. . . . The poet's picture of 'nature red in tooth and claw with rapine' is a picture of the evil which is read into it by our imaginations, the reality being made up of full and happy lives, usually terminated by the quickest and least painful of deaths."

4. See Mivart, "Lessons from Nature," pp. 368, 369, cited by Orr.

(5) Here we offer a view that we have not seen suggested by writers on Theism. Personally we have so much faith in the wisdom and goodness of God who was able to make this wonderful universe as to believe that, in some way and at some time, He will *mete out equal justice to all his sentient creatures* which have ever suffered unjustly. While we have no oracular declaration to make, nor even an absolute conviction to express, we agree with a recent writer[5] that, if God shall see fit to bestow immortality on the best part of His animal world, we shall at least find no reason to object to His plan. By so doing He might sometime make every wrong right even in the animal world. There is some hint of this doctrine in the Bible, which speaks of a millennial age when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion together, and a little child shall lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed: their young shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. * * * They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain; for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of Jehovah, as the waters cover the sea" (Isaiah 11: 6-9).

9. It should be remembered that *pain is nowhere in nature ordained for its own sake,* but is an incident along the way of progress. This may be an index that the ulterior purpose of pain is disciplinary.

10. In the *human world pain has its uses:*

(1) It heightens pleasure by contrast.

(2) It warns of peril, and thus helps to preserve health and life.

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5. William Hayes Ward in "What I Believe and Why."

(3) It leads to careful study and observance of nature's laws.

(4) It develops patience, hardihood, and other sterling virtues.

11. *Hardship disciplines men in strength and sturdiness;* without it they would be weak physically and inane morally.

12. *Danger develops courage.* How else could the heroic virtues be cultivated? Is it better to have supine beings, or beings who are morally noble, strong and brave?

13. Mystery in the world and in human experience *calls out the noble virtue of trust in God.* If we could understand all things, there would be no opportunity for the exercise and development of this virtue.

14. In general it may be said that the world cannot be explained without taking into consideration *moral values;* and since we know, as has been seen in the Moral Argument, that this world is a moral economy, the person who tries to explain it merely as a utilitarian and pleasure-giving administration will be balked at every step, and will ultimately land in pessimism.

However, if moral excellence is the highest excellence, we can see that a world of trial and mystery is the best regimen in which to acquire moral discipline; indeed, how could true moral character be attained without moral testing? Therefore, whatever else may be said of the present *regime,* it is precisely adapted for the highest moral purposes. For the epicurean and hedonist it is not a satisfactory world; but the true and sturdy ethicist, who values moral achievement above mere pleasure, has no reason for complaint.[6] Thus, respecting the problem of God's good-

6. See Sheldon, "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 135-149; Orr, "The Christian View," etc., pp. 51-57, 66-72, 167-170, 186,

ness in view of the present order of the world, men should not permit themselves to fall into pessimism. This leads us to our next division.

IV. CONTRAST BETWEEN PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.

1. Characteristics of Pessimism.

(1) It *exaggerates the evil and overlooks or minimizes the good* in the world.

(2) It cares only for *temporal and sensuous good,* for the pleasurable, and fails to appreciate moral, spiritual and eternal values. It is blind to the moral use of discipline and hard tasks.

(3) It becomes *daunted in the presence of difficulties* instead of bravely trying to surmount them and find exhilaration in the effort.

(4) It means the *eclipse of faith, hope and love*—that splendid triumvirate of virtues.

(5) It is another name for *moral flabbiness.* It is given to complaint; it grows more and more cynical. It gives up to *ennui,* becomes *blasé.* Instead of plowing up the weeds in its garden, mellowing and fertilizing the soil, and sowing

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321, 401, 467. Pringle-Pattison ("The Idea of God," pp. 403ff.) incisively criticises "the purely hedonistic character" of the ideals of Hume, Mill, James and McTaggart. To quote in part: "Mill's notion . . . might give us a world of automata receiving their daily doles of pleasure, but it could give us neither the minds nor the characters we know" (p. 405). "The universe is not perfect in the sense that it contains nothing but undiluted enjoyment. We degrade it to a child's paradise in so conceiving it" (p. 407). It might be added that, while we quote approvingly here and there from Pringle-Pattison, we certainly cannot endorse his doctrine of an eternal creation nor his criticism of the Christian conception of God as a Trinity. He is an author who must be read with discrimination.

useful seeds, it sits down and moans because nature or nature's God permits weeds to grow. It looks upon the world as a lapse and misfortune; an economy of sorrow and evil. Schopenhauer said: "This is the worst posible world." Von Hartmann was not willing to go quite so far, but his view was doleful enough: "If this is not the worst world, it is at least worse than none."

2. Characteristics of Rational Optimism.[7]

(1) It *recognizes* the evils of the world both as *reality and evil.* The optimism that fails to do this, or that calls the evil good, is not rational, but Utopian and flighty.

(2) However, rational optimism *sees and cherishes the good* in the world, and *believes* that it *predominates.*

(3) So far from spending valuable time in bemoaning the evil, and speculating about its cause, it seeks to *mitigate and reduce* it, and make the *good triumphant.*

(4) It sees in the world just as it is an *arena for manly conflict* and a school for the discipline and development of all the sterling and heroic virtues.

(5) It *trusts in God and the good,* and is sure of ultimate victory. It never knows defeat. It is sustained by

7. Here it may be well to explain Meliorism, which is the doctrine "that the world tends to become better and that man has the power of aiding its betterment—contrasted with *pessimism,* which asserts that the world is hopelessly bad, and *optimism,* which asserts that it is wholly or predominantly good" (Webster). Why not use the term Meliorism, then, instead of Rational Optimism, in the text? Because Meliorism as a system holds that evil is eternal and that God is finite; therefore we retain the term Rational Optimism in the text as being less liable to lead to serious error. Our doctrine is that God is infinite; that He created the universe good, wholly good; that evil has come into the world through the wrong choice of free moral agents; that God, being all-powerful and all-wise, will in His own good time and way overcome and eliminate the evil.

faith, hope and love. Its chief refrains are the following: "All things work together for good to them that love God" (Rom. 8:28). "Our light affliction, which is but for the moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" (2 Cor. 4:17). It takes to itself the inspiration and comfort of William Cowper's impressive hymn:

"God moves in a mysterious way
His wonders to perform;
He plants His footsteps on the sea,
And rides upon the storm.

"Deep in unfathomable mines
Of never-failing skill,
He treasures up His bright designs,
And works His sovereign will.

"Judge not the Lord by feeble sense,
But trust Him for His grace;
Behind a frowning providence
He hides a smiling face."

(6) Therefore, to sum it all up, rational optimism believes in the infinite goodness of God, holding that He seeth high and wise; that He knows the end from the beginning, and so cannot be balked in His plans; that He does all things well; that He has made the universe friendly, even though we cannot always understand His ways; that He will "bring good out of evil and make the wrath of man to praise Him;" that He will ultimately cause right and truth to triumph over every foe.

CHAPTER XVI

THE DIVINE RELATIONS

I. DEFINITION.

By the term divine relations we mean God's connection with the universe which He has created and which He sustains.

II. CLASSIFICATION.

1. Transcendence.

This means that God is *greater than the universe.* It is finite; He is infinite. He is distinct in His essence from the universe; not, as Pantheism holds, identified or consubstantiated with it. On this account He is able to exercise perfect control over it, and preserve it from destruction.

As a personal Being, God must be transcendent respecting His cosmos. If He were identical with the universe, which is non-personal, He too would be non-personal. That God is and must be a personal Being has been proved by many of our foregoing arguments. While we cannot comprehend the doctrine of the divine transcendence, we at least have an intuitive conception of it, and reason teaches that no other view of God and the world is tenable.

2. Immanence.

By this term is meant that God is *present everywhere in His universe,* and governs and cares for it according to the laws and principles which He has ordained.

The proofs of God's immanence have already been presented and need no further elaboration. While immanence may involve mystery, it is only like all the other mysteries that surround us. The physicist teaches that the universal ether is the substratum of all palpable substance; yet we cannot understand its composition nor the forces that cause it to produce the varied phenomena of the material universe. So the immanence of the personal God in the cosmos may involve an insoluble mystery for the present; yet all the processes of reasoning lead to the conclusion that God must be a person and must be personally present in every part of His universe.

Thus, in conclusion, reason proves, so far as reason can prove any proposition, the fact of the divine existence in two ways: First, *positively,* by means of the several arguments employed in Part II of this work; second, *negatively,* by the presentation of the arguments which show that all anti-theistic positions are logically untenable. As a necessary corollary to the positive and negative arguments, the divine attributes and relations are also established by the rational process.

The chief purpose of this book will be accomplished if the student and reader have been led to realize clearly and positively that our human life, in spite of all its limitations, trials and mysteries, is more than worth while, is even great and inspiring, because "God is in heaven, and all's well with the world." True, there may be *lacunae* in some of our logical processes; yet it is broadly and sanely rational to accept that doctrine which affords the greatest zest and incentive to the development of nobility of life and character; and surely such moral and spiritual uplift dwells most congenially with the theistic conception.

So far as regards the present situation, we do not believe that it is quite as discouraging today as Dr. Leuba's questionnaire of a few years ago would seem to indicate.[8] It is all too true that atheism and mechanism prevail to a sad extent in this country and other lands; yet it is also true that many of the outstanding scientists of our day have declared themselves on the side of Theism, holding that the phenomena of nature find their best, and, indeed, their only adequate, explication in that doctrine. A number of impressive writers have also taken the position of Personalism in Philosophy, which means that the only sufficient explanation of the universe is God. In Psychology, too, the skies seem to have grown brighter; for when men of international repute as experts in that vigorous science aver their firm belief in *purposive psychology* and in *dualism* and *interaction* over against *monistic* theories, the next step must logically lead to the adoption of the theistic world-view.

8. See the prefaces to the first and second editions of this book.

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